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This paper discusses an alternative to conditioning that may be used when the probability 
distribution is not fully specified. It does not require any assumptions (such as CAR: 
coarsening at random) on the unknown distribution. The well-known Monty Hall problem 
is the simplest scenario where neither naive conditioning nor the CAR assumption 
suffice to determine an updated probability distribution. This paper thus addresses a 
generalization of that problem to arbitrary distributions on finite outcome spaces, arbitrary 
sets of ‘messages’, and (almost) arbitrary loss functions, and provides existence and 
characterization theorems for robust probability updating strategies. We find that for 
logarithmic loss, optimality is characterized by an elegant condition, which we call 
RCAR (reverse coarsening at random). Under certain conditions, the same condition also 
characterizes optimality for a much larger class of loss functions, and we obtain an 
objective and general answer to how one should update probabilities in the light of new 
information.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
There are many situations in which a decision maker receives incomplete data and still has to reach conclusions about 
these data. One type of incomplete data is coarse data: instead of the real outcome of a random event, the decision maker 
observes a subset of the possible outcomes, and knows only that the actual outcome is an element of this subset. An ex-
ample frequently occurs in questionnaires, where people may be asked if their date of birth lies between 1950 and 1960 or 
between 1960 and 1970 et cetera. Their exact year of birth is unknown to us, but at least we now know for sure in which 
decade they are born. We introduce a simple and concrete motivating instance of coarse data with the following example.
Example A (Fair die). Suppose I throw a fair die. I get to see the result of the throw, but you do not. Now I tell you that 
the result lies in the set {1, 2, 3, 4}. This is an example of coarse data. You know that I used a fair die and that what I tell 
you is true. Now you are asked to give the probability that I rolled a 3. Likely, you would say that the probability of each of 
the remaining possible results is 1/4. This is the knee-jerk reaction of someone who studied probability theory, since this 
is standard conditioning. But is this always correct?
✩ This work is adapted from dissertation [1, Chapters 6 and 7], which extends M.Sc. thesis [2].
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I can now follow a coarsening mechanism: a procedure that tells me which subset to reveal given a particular result of 
the die roll. If the outcome is 1, 2, 5, or 6, there is nothing for me to choose. Suppose that if the outcome is 3 or 4, the 
coarsening mechanism I use selects set {1, 2, 3, 4} or set {3, 4, 5, 6} at random, each with probability 1/2. If I throw the die 
6000 times, I expect to see the outcome 3 a thousand times. Therefore I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4} five hundred 
times after I see the outcome 3. It is clear that I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4} 3000 times in total. So for die rolls 
where I told you {1, 2, 3, 4}, the probability of the true outcome being 3 is actually 1/6 with this coarsening mechanism. 
We see that the prediction of 1/4 from the first paragraph was not correct, in the sense that the probabilities computed 
there do not correspond to the long-run relative frequencies. We conclude that the knee-jerk reaction is not always correct.
In Example A we have seen that standard conditioning does not always give the correct answers. Heitjan and Rubin [3]
answer the question under what circumstances standard conditioning of coarse data is correct. They discovered a necessary 
and sufficient condition of the coarsening mechanism, called coarsening at random (CAR). A coarsening mechanism satisfies 
the CAR condition if, for each subset y of the outcomes, the probability of choosing to report y is the same no matter 
which outcome x ∈ y is the true outcome. It depends on the arrangement of possible revealed subsets whether a coarsening 
mechanism exists that satisfies CAR. It holds automatically if the subsets that can be revealed partition the sample space. 
As noted by Grünwald and Halpern [4] however, as soon as events overlap, there exist distributions on the space for which 
CAR does not hold. In many such situations it even cannot hold; see Gill and Grünwald [5] for a complete characterization 
of the — quite restricted — set of situations in which CAR can hold. No coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR condition 
for Example A.
We hasten to add that we neither question the validity of conditioning nor do we want to replace it by something else. 
The real problem lies not with conditioning, but with conditioning within the wrong sample space, in which the coarsening 
mechanism cannot be represented. If we had a distribution P on the correct, larger space, which allows for statements like 
‘the probability is α that I choose {1, 2, 3, 4} to reveal if the outcome is 3’, then conditioning would give the correct results. 
The problem with coarse data is though that we often do not have enough information to identify P — e.g. we do not know 
the value of α and do not want to assume that it is 1/2. Henceforth, we shall refer to conditioning in the overly simple 
space as ‘naive conditioning’. In this paper we propose update rules for situations in which naive conditioning gives the 
wrong answer, and conditioning in the right space is problematic because the underlying distribution is partially unknown. 
These are invariably situations in which two or more of the potentially observed events overlap.
We illustrate this further with a famously counter-intuitive example: the Monty Hall puzzle, posed by Selvin [6] and 
popularized years later in Ask Marilyn, a weekly column in Parade Magazine by Marilyn vos Savant [7].
Example B (Monty Hall). Suppose you are on a game show and you may choose one of three doors. Behind one of the doors 
a car can be found, but the other two only hide a goat. Initially the car is equally likely to be behind each of the doors. After 
you have picked one of the doors, the host Monty Hall, who knows the location of the prize, will open one of the other 
doors, revealing a goat. Now you are asked if you would like to switch from the door you chose to the other unopened 
door. Is it a good idea to switch?
At this moment we will not answer this question, but we show that the problem of choosing whether to switch doors 
is an example of the coarse data problem. The unknown random value we are interested in is the location of the car: one 
of the three doors. When the host opens a door different from the one you picked, revealing a goat, this is equivalent to 
reporting a subset. The subset he reports is the set of the two doors that are still closed. For example, if he opens door 2, 
this tells us that the true value, the location of the car, is in the subset {1, 3}. Note that if you have by chance picked the 
correct door, there are two possible doors Monty Hall can open, so also two subsets he can report. This implies that Monty 
has a choice in reporting a subset. How does Monty’s coarsening mechanism influence your prediction of the true location 
of the car?
The CAR condition can only be satisfied for very particular distributions of where the prize is: the probability that the 
prize is hidden behind the initially chosen door must be either 0 or 1, otherwise no CAR coarsening mechanism exists [4, 
Example 3.3].1 If the prize is hidden in any other way, for example uniformly at random as we assume, then CAR cannot 
hold, and naive conditioning will result in an incorrect conclusion for at least one of the two subsets.
Examples A and B are just two instances of a more general problem: the number of outcomes may be arbitrary; the initial 
distribution of the true outcome may be any distribution; and the subsets of outcomes that may be reported to the decision 
maker may be any family of sets. Our goal is to define general procedures that tell us how to update the probabilities 
of the outcomes after making a coarse observation, in such situations where naive conditioning is not adequate. We are 
aiming for modular methods that do not enforce a particular interpretation of probability. In Example A, we saw “objective” 
probabilities: the original distributions were known, and the updated probabilities we found could again be interpreted as 
frequencies over many repetitions of the same experiment. The original distribution of the outcomes could however also 
1 This uses the weak version of CAR in the terminology of Jaeger [8], in which outcomes with probability 0 are exempt from the equality constraint. 
A strong CAR coarsening mechanism does not exist regardless of the probabilities with which the prize is hidden.
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the location of the car requires an assumption on the frequentist’s part, while it may be a reasonable choice of prior for 
a subjective Bayesian [9]. In this case, the updated probabilities after a coarse observation take the role of the Bayesian 
posterior distribution. In any case, we will refer to the initial probability of an outcome, regardless of observations, as the 
marginal probability.
Without any assumptions on the quizmaster’s strategy (i.e. the coarsening mechanism), the conditional distributions 
of outcomes given observations will be unknown, and this uncertainty cannot be fully expressed by a single probability 
distribution over the outcomes. One way to deal with this is by means of imprecise probability, i.e. by explicitly tracking all 
possible quizmaster strategies and their effects [10]. We however focus on obtaining a single (precise) updated probability. 
To get such a single answer, we could make some assumption about how the quizmaster chooses his strategy. Assuming 
that the coarsening mechanism satisfies CAR is one such approach, but as we saw in the two examples, there are scenarios 
where this assumption cannot hold. We instead take a worst-case approach, treating the coarsening of the observation and 
the subsequent probability update as a game between two players: the quizmaster and the contestant (named for their roles 
in the Monty Hall scenario). The subset of outcomes communicated by the quizmaster to the contestant will be called the 
message.
In this fictional game, the quizmaster’s goal is the opposite of the contestant’s, namely to make predicting the true 
outcome as hard as possible for the contestant. This type of zero-sum game, in which some information is revealed to the 
contestant was also considered by Grünwald and Halpern [11] and Ozdenoren and Peck [12]. Such situations are rare in 
practice: The sender of a message might be motivated by interests other than informing us (for example, a newspaper may 
be trying to optimize its sales figures, or a company may want to present its performance in the best light), but rarely by 
trying to be as uninformative as possible (though see Section 5.5, where we consider the case that the players’ goals are 
not diametrically opposed). In other situations, the ‘sender’ might not be a rational being at all, but just some unknown 
process. Yet this game is a useful way to look at the problem of updating our probabilities even if we do not believe that 
the coarsening mechanism is chosen adversarially: if we simply do not know how ‘nature’ chooses which message to give 
us and do not want to make any assumptions about this, then choosing the worst-case (or minimax) optimal probability 
update as defined here guarantees that we incur at most some fixed expected loss, while any other probability update may 
lead to a larger expected loss depending on the unknown coarsening mechanism. While from a Bayesian point of view, such 
a choice might at first seem overly pessimistic, we note that in all cases we consider, our approach is fully consistent with a 
Bayesian one — our results can be interpreted as recommending a certain prior on the quizmaster’s assignment of messages 
to outcomes, which in simple cases (such as Monty Hall) coincides with a prior that Bayesians would be tempted to adopt 
as well.
We will employ a loss function to measure how well the quizmaster and the contestant are doing at this game. Our 
results apply to a wide variety of loss functions. For an analysis of the Monty Hall game, 0–1 loss would be appropriate, 
as the contestant must choose a single door; this is the approach used by Gill [9] and Gnedin [13]. Other loss functions, 
such as logarithmic loss and Brier loss (see e.g. Grünwald and Dawid [14]), also allow the contestant to formulate their 
prediction of where the prize is hidden as an arbitrary probability distribution over the outcomes.
We model probability updating as a game as follows. An outcome x is drawn with known marginal probability px and 
shown to the quizmaster, who picks a consistent message y  x using his coarsening mechanism P (y | x). Seeing only y, the 
contestant makes a prediction in the form of a probability mass function Q (· | y) on outcomes. Then x is revealed and the 
prediction quality measured using the loss function L. The quizmaster/contestant aim to maximize/minimize the expected 
loss ∑
x
px
∑
yx
P (y | x)L(x, Q (· | y)). (1)
For the Monty Hall game with logarithmic or Brier, i.e. squared loss, the worst-case optimal answer for the contestant is 
to put probability 1/3 on his initially chosen door and 2/3 on the other door. (These probabilities agree with the literature 
on the Monty Hall game.) Surprisingly, we will see (in Example D on page 40) that for very similar games, logarithmic and 
Brier loss may lead to two different answers!
We will find that for finite outcome spaces, both players in our game have worst-case optimal strategies for many loss 
functions: the quizmaster has a strategy that makes the contestant’s prediction task as hard as possible, and the contestant 
has a strategy that is guaranteed to give good predictions no matter how the quizmaster coarsens. We give characterizations 
that allow us to recognize such strategies, for different conditions on the loss functions.
Example A (continued). For logarithmic loss, the worst-case optimal prediction of the die roll conditional on the revealed 
subset is found with the help of Theorem 10. The worst-case optimal prediction given that you observe the set {1, 2, 3, 4}
is: predict outcomes 1 and 2 each with probability 1/3, and predict 3 and 4 each with probability 1/6. Symmetrically, given 
that you observe the set {3, 4, 5, 6}, the worst-case optimal prediction is: 3 and 4 with probability 1/6, and 5 and 6 with 
probability 1/3.
These probabilities correspond with the uniform coarsening mechanism given earlier. However, it is a good prediction 
even if you do not know what coarsening mechanism I am using. An intuitive argument for this is the following: If I wanted, 
I could use a very extreme coarsening mechanism, always choosing to reveal the set {1, 2, 3, 4} when the die comes up 3 
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or 4. But this is balanced by the possibility that I might be using the opposite coarsening mechanism, which always reveals 
{3, 4, 5, 6} if the result is 3 or 4. The worst-case optimal prediction given above hedges against both possibilities.
1.1. Overview of contents
In Section 2, we will give a precise definition of the ‘conditioning game’ we described. In Section 3, we find general 
conditions on the loss function under which worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and contestant exist, and we 
characterize such strategies. (See Fig. 3 for a visual illustration of the concepts used in this section.) If stronger conditions 
hold, worst-case optimal strategies for both players may be easier to recognize. This is explored for two classes of loss 
functions in Section 4; in particular, we find that for local proper loss functions (among which logarithmic loss), worst-case 
optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by a simple condition on their probabilities that we call the RCAR 
(reverse CAR) condition. RCAR bears a striking similarity to CAR, but with the roles of outcomes and messages interchanged. 
Also, by Lemma 14, if a betting game is played repeatedly and the contestant is allowed to distribute investments over 
different outcomes and to reinvest all capital gained so far in each round, then the same strategy is optimal, regardless of the 
pay-offs! An overview of the theorems and the conditions under which they apply is given in Table 1 on page 37.
Then in Section 5 we look at the influence of the set of available messages, imposing only the minimal symmetry 
requirement on the loss function. We prove that for graph and matroid games (and only these) the optimality condition is 
again RCAR. As RCAR is independent of the loss function, for such games probability updating can hence be meaningfully 
defined and performed completely agnostic of the task at hand. Many examples are included to illustrate (the limits of) the 
theoretical results. Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. An overview of the results in this work is presented in Fig. 1. 
All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Highlight A central feature of probability distributions is that they summarize what a decision maker would do under 
a variety of circumstances (loss functions): for each particular loss function the decision maker minimizes expected loss 
(maximizes utility) using the same distribution no matter what specific loss function is used. Since we generalize condi-
tioning by using a minimax approach, one might expect that for different loss functions one ends up with different updated 
probabilities. Still, we show that for a rich selection of scenarios optimality is characterized by the RCAR condition, which is 
independent of the loss function. As a result, our updated probabilities are application-independent, and we may hence think 
of them — if we are willing to take a cautious (minimax) approach — as expressing what an experimenter should believe 
after having received the data.
We isolate two distinct classes of scenarios where such application independence obtains. First, games with graph and 
matroid message sets (extending Monty Hall) and symmetric loss functions. Second, graphs with arbitrary message sets and 
proper local loss functions, including the symmetric logarithmic loss as well as its asymmetric generalizations appropri-
ate for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs. In these scenarios our application-independent update rule has an objective 
appeal, and we feel that its importance may transcend that of being “merely” minimax optimal.
This work is an extension of Feenstra [2] to loss functions other than logarithmic loss, and to the case where the 
worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster assigns probability 0 to some combinations of outcomes x and messages y
with x ∈ y. It can also be seen as a concrete application of the ideas in Grünwald and Dawid [14] about minimax optimal 
decision making and its relation to entropy. A more extensive discussion of worst-case optimal probability updating can 
be found in Van Ommen [1]; in particular, there the question of efficient algorithms for determining worst-case optimal 
strategies is also considered.
2. Definitions and problem formulation
A (probability updating) game G is defined as a quadruple (X , Y, p, L), where X is a finite set, Y is a family of distinct 
subsets of X with ⋃y∈Y y =X , p is a strictly positive probability mass function on X , and L is a function L :X × X →[0, ∞], where X is the set of all probability mass functions on X . We call X the outcome space, Y the message structure, p
the marginal distribution, and L the loss function. It is clear that outcomes with zero marginal probability p do not contribute 
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to our example.
Example B (continued). We assume the car is hidden uniformly at random behind one of the three doors. With this as-
sumption, we can abstract away the initial choice of a door by the contestant: by symmetry, we can assume without loss 
of generality that he always picks door 2. Then the probability updating game starts with the quizmaster opening door 1 or 
3, thereby giving the message “the car is behind door 2 or 3” or “the car is behind door 1 or 2”, respectively. This can be 
expressed as follows in our formalization:
• outcome space X = {x1, x2, x3};
• message space Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 = {x2, x3};
• marginal distribution p uniform on X .
If a loss function L is also given, this fully specifies a game. One example is randomized 0–1 loss, which is given by 
L(x, Q ) = 1 − Q (x). Here x is the true outcome, and Q is the contestant’s prediction of the true outcome in the form of 
a probability distribution. Thus the prediction Q is awarded a smaller loss if it assigned a larger probability Q (x) to the 
outcome x that actually obtained. We will see other examples of loss functions in Section 2.2.
A function from some finite set S to the reals R = (−∞, ∞) corresponds to an |S|-dimensional vector when we fix an 
order on the elements of S . We write RS for the set of such functions/vectors. Even if no order on S is specified, this allows 
us to apply concepts from linear algebra to RS without ambiguity. For example, we may say that some set is an affine 
subspace of RS . (This identification and the resulting notation are also used by Schrijver [15].)
Using this correspondence, we identify the elements of X with the |X |-dimensional vectors in the unit simplex, though 
we use ordinary function notation P (x) for its elements. The probability mass function p that is part of a game’s definition 
is also a vector in X . Vector notation px will be used to refer to its elements to set p apart from P , which will denote 
distributions chosen by the quizmaster rather than fixed by the game.
For any message y ⊆ X , we define y = {P ∈ X | P (x) = 0 for x /∈ y}. Note that these are vectors of the same length 
as those in X , though contained within a lower-dimensional affine subspace.
A loss function L is called proper if P ∈ argminQ ∈X EX∼P L(X, Q ) for all P ∈ X , and strictly proper if this minimizer
is unique (this is standard terminology; see for instance Gneiting and Raftery [16]). Thus if a predicting agent believes the 
true distribution of an outcome to be given by some P , such a loss function will encourage him to report Q = P as his 
prediction.
2.1. Strategies
Strategies for the players are specified by conditional distributions: a strategy P for the quizmaster consists of distribu-
tions on Y , one for each possible x ∈ X , and a strategy Q for the contestant consists of distributions on X , one for each 
possible y ∈ Y . These strategies define how the two players act in any situation: the quizmaster’s strategy defines how 
he chooses a message containing the true outcome (the coarsening mechanism), and the contestant’s strategy defines his 
prediction for each message he might receive.
We write P (· | x) for the distribution on Y the quizmaster plays when the true outcome is x ∈ X . Because px > 0, 
this conditional distribution can be recovered from the joint P (x, y) := P (y | x)px; we will use this joint distribution to 
specify a strategy for the quizmaster. If P (y) :=∑x∈y P (x, y) > 0, we may also write P (· | y) for the vector in y given 
by P (x | y) := P (x, y)/P (y). No such rewrites can be made for Q , as no marginal Q (y) is specified by the game or by the 
strategy Q . To shorten notation and to emphasize that Q is not a joint distribution, we write Q |y rather than Q (· | y) for 
the distribution that the contestant plays in response to message y.
We restrict the quizmaster to conditional distributions P for which P (y | x) = 0 if x /∈ y; that is, he may not ‘lie’ to the 
contestant. We make no similar requirement on the contestant’s choice of Q , though for proper loss functions, and in fact 
all other loss functions we will consider in our examples, the contestant can gain nothing from using a strategy Q for which 
Q |y(x) > 0 where x /∈ y.
P x1 x2 x3
y1 1/3 1/6 –
y2 – 1/6 1/3
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
(2)
Example B (continued). The table to the right specifies all aspects of a game except for
its loss function: its outcome space (here, for the Monty Hall game, X = {x1, x2, x3}), 
message space (Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 = {x2, x3}) and marginal distribu-
tion (p uniform on X ). In this table we have filled in a strategy P for the quizmaster in 
the form of a joint distribution on pairs of x and y. The cells in the table where x /∈ y
are marked with a dash to indicate that P may not assign positive probability there. 
The probabilities in each column sum to the marginal probabilities at the bottom, so this joint distribution P has the cor-
rect marginal distribution on the outcomes. For this particular strategy, if the true outcome is x2, the quizmaster will give 
message y1 or y2 to the contestant with equal probability.
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game, there are four such pairs: R(X ,Y) = {(x1, y1), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y2)}. The notation RR(X ,Y)≥0 represents the set of 
all functions from R(X ,Y) to R≥0. If P is an element of this set and (x, y) ∈R(X ,Y), the value of P at (x, y) is denoted 
by P (x, y). For (x, y) with x /∈ y, the notation P (x, y) does not correspond to a value of the function, but is taken to be 0.
We again identify the elements of RR(X ,Y)≥0 with vectors. Thus the mass function P shown in (2) is identified with a 
four-element vector (1/3, 1/6, 1/6, 1/3). (We could have chosen a different ordering instead.)
We define the set P of strategies for the quizmaster as {P ∈ RR(X ,Y)≥0 |
∑
yx P (x, y) = px for all x}; this is a convex set. 
The set of strategies for the contestant is Q := YX = {(Q |y)y∈Y | Q |y ∈ X for each y ∈Y}.
For given strategies P and Q , the expected loss the contestant incurs (1) is∑
x∈X
px
∑
y∈Y:x∈y
P (y | x)L(x, Q |y) = EX∼p EY∼P (·|X) L(X, Q |Y ) = E(X,Y )∼P L(X, Q |Y ). (3)
We allow L to take the value ∞; if this value occurs with positive probability, then the contestant’s expected loss is infinite. 
However, for terms where the probability is zero, we define 0 · ∞ = 0, as is consistent with measure-theoretic probability.
We model the probability updating problem as a zero-sum game between two players with objective (3): the quizmas-
ter chooses P ∈ P to maximize (3), while simultaneously (that is, without knowing P ) the contestant chooses Q ∈ Q to 
minimize that quantity. The game (X , Y, p, L) is common knowledge for the two players.
If the contestant knew the quizmaster’s strategy, he would pick a strategy Q that for each y minimizes the expected 
loss of predicting x given y. When the contestant receives a message and knows the distribution P ∈ X over the outcomes 
given that message, this expected loss is written as
HL(P ) := inf
Q ∈X
∑
x
P (x)L(x, Q ) = inf
Q ∈X
EX∼P L(X, Q ). (4)
This is the generalized entropy of P for loss function L [14]. (Note that in the preceding display, P and Q are not strategies 
but simply distributions over X .) If the contestant picks his strategy Q this way, (3) becomes the expected generalized entropy
of the quizmaster’s strategy P ∈P :∑
y∈Y
P (y)HL(P (· | y)), (5)
where we again define terms with P (y) = 0 as 0. We say a strategy P is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster if it maximizes 
this expected generalized entropy over all P ∈ P . We call the version of the game where the quizmaster has to play first 
the maximin game, where the order of the words ‘max’ and ‘min’ reflects the order in which they appear in the expression 
for the value of this game as well as the order in which the maximizing and minimizing players take their turns.
Similarly, if the contestant were to play first (the minimax game), his goal might be to find a strategy Q that minimizes 
his worst-case expected loss
max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P (x, y)L(x, Q |y) =max
P∈P E(X,Y )∼P L(X, Q |Y ). (6)
(In this case, the maximum is always achieved so we can write max rather than sup: for each x, the quizmaster can choose 
P that puts all mass on a y  x with the maximum loss.) We call a strategy worst-case optimal for the contestant if it achieves 
the minimum of (6).
It is an elementary result from game theory that if worst-case optimal strategies P∗ and Q ∗ exist for the two players, 
their expected losses are related by∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) ≤max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P (x, y)L(x, Q ∗|y) (7)
[17, Lemma 36.1: “maximin ≤ minimax”]. The inequality expresses that in a sequential game where one of the players 
knows the other’s strategy before choosing his own, the player to move second may have an advantage.
In the next section, we will see that in many probability updating games, worst-case optimal strategies for both players 
exist (but may not be unique), and the maximum expected generalized entropy equals the minimum worst-case expected 
loss: ∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) =max
P∈P
∑
x∈y
P (x, y)L(x, Q ∗|y). (8)
When this is the case, we say that the minimax theorem holds [18,19]. We remark here that our setting, while a zero-sum 
game, differs from the usual setting of zero-sum games in some respects: We consider possibly infinite loss and (in general) 
infinite sets of strategies available to the players, but do not allow the players to randomize over these strategies. Random-
izing over P would not give the quizmaster an advantage, as P is convex and he could just play the corresponding convex 
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essentially, the quizmaster is randomizing, over a finite set of strategies.) For the contestant, Q is also convex, but in general 
(depending on L), playing a convex combination of strategies does not correspond to randomizing over those strategies. The 
two do correspond in the case of randomized 0–1 loss, where L is linear. If L is convex, then playing the convex combina-
tion is at least as good for him as randomizing (and if L is strictly convex, better), so allowing randomization would again 
not give an advantage.
When (8) holds, any pair of worst-case optimal strategies (P∗, Q ∗) forms a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, a concept 
introduced by Nash [20]: neither player can benefit from deviating from their worst-case optimal strategy if the other player 
leaves his strategy unchanged. This means that the definitions of worst-case optimality given above are also meaningful in 
the game we are actually interested in, where the players move simultaneously in the sense that neither knows the other’s 
strategy when choosing his own.
2.2. Three standard loss functions
Three commonly used loss functions are logarithmic loss, Brier loss, and randomized 0–1 loss. These are defined as 
follows [14]:
Logarithmic loss is a strictly proper loss function, given by
L(x, Q ) = − log Q (x).
Its entropy is the Shannon entropy HL(P ) =∑x −P (x) log P (x). The functions L and HL are displayed in Fig. 2a for the case 
of a binary prediction (i.e. a prediction between two possible outcomes). The (three-dimensional) graph of HL for the case 
of three outcomes will appear in Fig. 3 on page 39.
Brier loss is another strictly proper loss function, corresponding to squared Euclidean distance:
L(x, Q ) =
∑
x′∈X
(
1x′=x − Q (x′)
)2 = (1− Q (x))2 + ∑
x′∈X ,x′ =x
Q (x′)2.
Its entropy function is HL(P ) = 1 −∑x∈X P (x)2; L and HL are displayed in Fig. 2b for a binary prediction. Note that for 3
outcomes and beyond, the Brier loss on outcome x is not simply a function of Q (x), it depends on the entire distribution Q .
The third loss function we will often refer to is randomized 0–1 loss, given by
L(x, Q ) = 1− Q (x).
It is improper: an optimal response Q to some distribution P puts all mass on outcome(s) with maximum P (x). Its entropy 
function is HL(P ) = 1 −maxx∈X P (x) (see Fig. 2c). It is related to hard 0–1 loss, which requires the contestant to pick a single 
outcome x′ and gives loss 0 if x′ = x and 1 otherwise. Randomized 0–1 loss essentially allows the contestant to randomize 
his prediction: L(x, Q ) equals the expected value of hard 0–1 loss when x′ is distributed according to Q . An important 
difference between games with hard and randomized 0–1 loss will be shown later in Example F.
2.3. On duplicate messages and outcomes
Our definition of a game rules out duplicate messages in Y , which would not meaningfully change the options of either 
player as the two messages represent the same move for the quizmaster; this will be made precise in Lemma 2. The 
definition does allow duplicate outcomes: pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈X such that x1 ∈ y if and only if x2 ∈ y for all y ∈ Y . 
We will see later (in Example D) that games with such outcomes cannot generally be solved in terms of games without, 
and thus we must analyse them in their own right.
3. Worst-case optimal strategies
In this section, we present characterization theorems that allow worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and 
contestant to be recognized for a large class of loss functions. In order to be applicable to a wide range of loss functions, 
this section is rather technical, and the characterizations of worst-case optimal strategies we find here are not always easy to 
use (though the abstract results in these sections are illustrated by concrete examples in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.3). We will 
find simpler characterizations for smaller classes of loss functions in Section 4. An overview of these results is given in 
Table 1.
We will need the following properties of HL throughout our theory:
Lemma 1. For all loss functions L, if HL is finite, then it is also concave and lower semi-continuous. If L is finite everywhere, then HL is 
finite, concave, and continuous.
(When we talk about (semi-)continuity, this is always with respect to the extended real line topology of losses, as in 
Rockafellar [17, Section 7].)
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Table 1
Results on worst-case optimal strategies for different loss functions.
Conditions on L Results Example
HL finite and continuous P∗ exists and is characterized by Theorem 3 hard 0–1 loss
HL finite and continuous; 
all minimal supporting 
hyperplanes realizable
Q ∗ exists and a Nash equilibrium exists by 
Theorem 5; Q ∗ characterized by Theorem 7
randomized 0–1 loss
L proper and continuous; 
HL finite and continuous
all the above simplified by Theorem 9 Brier loss
L local and proper;
HL finite and continuous
characterization of P∗ simplified further by 
Theorem 10 (RCAR condition)
logarithmic loss
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We start by studying the probability updating game from the perspective of the quizmaster. Using just the concavity of 
the quizmaster’s objective (5) (which is a linear combination of concave generalized entropies), we can prove the following 
intuitive result.
Lemma 2 (Message subsumption). Suppose that for P ∈ P there are two messages y1, y2 ∈ Y such that any outcome x ∈ y2 with 
P (x, y2) > 0 is also in y1 . Then if HL is concave, the quizmaster can do at least as well without using y2. More precisely, P ′ given by
P ′(x, y) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P (x, y1) + P (x, y2) for y = y1;
0 for y = y2;
P (x, y) otherwise
is also in P and its expected generalized entropy is at least as large as that of P . In particular, if P is worst-case optimal, then so is P ′.
In particular, if y1 ⊃ y2, any strategy P can be replaced by a strategy P ′ with P ′(y2) = 0 without making things worse 
for the quizmaster. Thus the quizmaster, who wants to maximize the contestant’s expected loss, never needs to use a 
message that is contained in another.
A dominating hyperplane to a function f from D ⊆ RX to R is a hyperplane in RX × R that is nowhere below f . A sup-
porting hyperplane to f (at P ) is a dominating hyperplane that touches f at some point P .2 A concave function has at 
least one supporting hyperplane at every point [17, Theorem 11.6], but it may be vertical. A nonvertical hyperplane can be 
described by a linear function  : RX → R: (P ) = α +∑x P (x)λx , where α ∈ R and λ ∈ RX .
While HL is defined as a function on X , we will often need to talk about supporting hyperplanes to the function HL
restricted to y for some message y ∈ Y . We use the notation HL  y for the restriction of HL to the domain y . (Recall 
that we defined y as a subset of X .) A supporting hyperplane to HL  y is not a supporting hyperplane to HL itself if 
it goes below HL at some P ∈ X \ y .
A supergradient is a generalization of the gradient: a supergradient of a concave function at a point is the gradient of 
a supporting hyperplane. If HL  y is finite and continuous (and thus concave by Lemma 1), then for any vector λ ∈ RX , 
a unique supporting hyperplane to HL  y can be found having that vector as its gradient, by choosing α appropriately in 
(P ) = α+∑x P (x)λx [17, Theorem 27.3]. It will often be convenient in our discussion to talk about supporting hyperplanes 
rather than supergradients because they fix this choice of α.
Theorem 3 (Existence and characterization of P∗). For HL finite and upper semi-continuous (thus continuous), a worst-case optimal 
strategy for the quizmaster (that is, a P ∈P maximizing (5)) exists, and P∗ is such a strategy if and only if there exists a λ∗ ∈ RX such 
that
HL(P
′) ≤
∑
x∈y
P ′(x)λ∗x for all y ∈ Y and P ′ ∈ y,
with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and P ′ = P∗(· | y). That is, for y with P∗(y) > 0, the linear function ∑x∈y P (x)λ∗x defines a supporting 
hyperplane to HL  y at P∗(· | y), and a dominating hyperplane for other y.
A vector λ∗ ∈ RX that satisfies the above for some worst-case optimal P∗ satisfies it for all worst-case optimal P∗ and is called a
Kuhn–Tucker vector (or KT-vector).
Several examples illustrating the application of Theorem 3 are given in Section 3.1.1; a graphical illustration of the 
theorem is also included there (Fig. 3). We will see in Section 3.2 that KT-vectors form the bridge between worst-case 
optimal strategies for the quizmaster and for the contestant.
3.1.1. Application to standard loss functions
The generalized entropy for logarithmic loss has only vertical supporting hyperplanes at the boundary of y for any 
y ∈Y . These hyperplanes do not correspond to any KT-vector λ∗ ∈ RX , from which it follows that for any y with P∗(y) > 0, 
the worst-case optimal strategy will not have P∗(· | y) at the boundary of y . The same is not generally true: we will see 
below how for randomized 0–1 loss (in Example B on page 39, and Example D) and Brier loss (in Example E), games may 
have a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster that has P∗(y) > 0, yet P∗(x | y) = 0 for some y ∈ Y , x ∈ y.
Of the three loss functions we saw earlier, Brier loss and 0–1 loss are finite, so by Lemma 1, all conditions of Theorem 3
are satisfied for them. Logarithmic loss is infinite when the obtained outcome was predicted to have probability zero. The 
generalized entropy is still finite, because for any true distribution P , there exist predictions Q that give finite expected loss 
2 We deviate slightly from standard terminology here: what we call a supporting hyperplane to a concave function f is usually called a supporting 
hyperplane to {(u, v) ∈ RX × R | v ≤ f (u)}, the hypograph of f .
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base is the full simplex X , on which the entropy function HL is defined (this is the grey dome); the points labelled x1, x2 and x3 are the elements of 
this simplex putting all mass on that single outcome; and the line segments y1 and y2 are the subsets of X consisting of all distributions supported 
on y1 and y2 respectively. Restricted to the domain y1 , the vector λ
∗ defines a linear function (having height λ∗x at each x ∈ X ) that is a supporting 
hyperplane to HL at P∗(· | y1) (and similar for y2). Note that when the linear function defined by λ∗ is extended to all of X , it may go below HL there, 
but not in y1 or y2 .
(in particular, Q = P does this). The entropy is also continuous: −P (x) log P (x) is continuous as a function of P (x) with our 
convention that 0 · ∞ = 0, and HL is the sum of such continuous functions. Thus we can apply Theorem 3 to analyse the 
Monty Hall problem for each of these three loss functions.
Example B (continued). For Monty Hall, the strategy P∗ of choosing a message uniformly when the true outcome is x2 is 
worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, for all three loss functions. It is easy to verify that the theorem is satisfied by this 
strategy combined with the appropriate KT-vector:
for logarithmic loss: λ∗ =
(
− log 2
3
,− log 1
3
,− log 2
3
)
;
for Brier loss: λ∗ =
(
2
9
,
8
9
,
2
9
)
;
for randomized 0–1 loss: λ∗ = (0,1,0).
The situation for logarithmic loss is illustrated in Fig. 3.
We also find that for logarithmic loss and Brier loss, P∗ is the unique worst-case optimal strategy, as the hyperplanes 
specified by λ∗ touch the generalized entropy functions at only one point each. For randomized 0–1 loss, on the other hand, 
all quizmaster strategies are worst-case optimal, as the hyperplane specified by λ∗ touches HL  y1 at all P (· | y1) with 
P (x1 | y1) ≥ 1/2.
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/5 1/5 – –
y2 – 0 0 –
y3 – – 1/5 2/5
px 1/5 1/5 1/5 2/5
Example C (The quizmaster discards a message). Consider a different game, with X = {x1, x2,
x3, x4}, Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3}, {x3, x4}}, p given by px4 = 2/5 and px = 1/5 elsewhere, and L
logarithmic loss. In the terminology of the Monty Hall puzzle, there is no initial choice by 
the contestant that determines what moves are available to the quizmaster, but the quiz-
master will again leave two doors closed: the one hiding the car, and another adjacent to 
it. Then one strategy for the quizmaster is to never give message y2 to the contestant; i.e. 
to pick the strategy P ∈ P with P (y2) = 0 shown to the right. The depicted strategy P is 
worst-case optimal: When applying the theorem, we see that the KT-vector λ∗ = (log2, log2, log3, − log(2/3)) gives sup-
porting hyperplanes to HL  y1 and HL  y3 , but a non-supporting dominating hyperplane to HL  y2 . This strategy can 
be seen to be intuitively reasonable because when the contestant receives message y3 = {x3, x4}, he knows that the proba-
bility of the true outcome being x4 is at least twice as large as the probability of it being x3. By always giving message y3
when the true outcome is x3, the quizmaster can keep this difference from becoming larger.
P is also the unique worst-case optimal strategy for Brier loss (as shown by the same analysis) and for randomized 0–1 
loss (where the KT-vector is not unique: (a, 1 − a, 1, 0) for any a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector).
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example shows that this is not always the case.
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/3 1/6 – –
y2 – 1/6 1/6 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/6 1/6
Example D (Dependence on loss function). Consider the family of games with X = {x1, x2, x3,
x4}, Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3, x4}}, px1 = px2 = 1/3, and px3 = px4 = 1/6: This game is also sim-
ilar to Monty Hall, but now one door has been ‘split in two’: the quizmaster will either 
open door 1, or doors 3 and 4. The strategy P shown to the right is worst-case optimal for 
logarithmic loss, but not for Brier loss: for both loss functions, there is a unique supporting 
hyperplane for both y that touches HL  y at P (· | y) for P as shown in the table, but for 
Brier loss, these two hyperplanes do not have the same height at the common outcome x2. (Using Theorem 9 from page 43, 
we can find the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster under Brier loss by solving a quadratic equation with one 
unknown; this strategy has P (x2, y1) = 11/3 − 2
√
3≈ 0.20 and P (x2, y2) = 2
√
3− 10/3 ≈ 0.13.)
For randomized 0–1 loss, neither the worst-case optimal strategy nor the KT-vector are unique: the KT-vectors are 
(0,1,a,1− a) for any a ∈ [0, 1]; the worst-case optimal strategies are the P given above, the strategy that always gives 
message y1 when the true outcome is x2, and all convex combinations of these.
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 0.45 0.05 – –
y2 – 0 0.25 0.25
px 0.45 0.05 0.25 0.25
Example E (The quizmaster discards a message-outcome pair). Again consider the game
from the previous example, but now with a different marginal as shown to the right. The 
strategy P is worst-case optimal for Brier loss, with KT-vector
λ∗ = (0.02,1.62,0.5,0.5).
P displays another curious property (that we also saw for randomized 0–1 loss in the 
previous example): while the quizmaster uses message y2 for some outcomes, he does not use it in combination with 
outcome x2. In the theorem, the hyperplane on y2 is supporting at P (· | y2), but is not a tangent plane: compared to the 
tangent plane, it has been ‘lifted up’ at the opposite vertex of the simplex y2 (x2) to the same height as the supporting 
hyperplane on y1 .
This behaviour cannot occur in games with logarithmic loss: as we observed at the beginning of Section 3.1.1, if a 
worst-case optimal strategy P∗ has P∗(y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y , then it must assign positive probability to P∗(x | y) for all 
x ∈ y.
3.2. Worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant
We now turn our attention to worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant. To this end, we look at the relation 
between the KT-vectors that appeared in Theorem 3 and the set of strategies Q the contestant can choose from.
3.2.1. Realizable hyperplanes
For any y ∈Y , y is defined in Section 2 as a (|y|−1)-dimensional subset of RX≥0. Thus a linear function  : y → R can 
be extended to a linear function ¯ on the domain RX≥0 in different ways. Hence many different vectors λ ∈ RX representing 
supporting hyperplanes will correspond to what we can view as a single supergradient, because the hyperplanes agree 
on y . We can make the extension unique by requiring ¯ to be zero at the origin and at the vertices of the simplex X \y . 
Because such a normalized function ¯ : RX≥0 → R obeys ¯(0) = 0, it can be written as ¯(P ) = Pλ for some λ. These functions 
are thus uniquely identified by their gradients λ, allowing us to refer to them using ‘the (supporting) hyperplane λ’. Let y
be the set of all gradients of such normalized functions that represent dominating hyperplanes to HL  y ; in formula, let
y = {λ ∈ RX | λx = 0 for x /∈ y, and ∀P ∈ y : Pλ ≥ HL(P )}.
For each nonvertical supporting hyperplane of HL  y , clearly the gradient is in y ; that is, all finite supergradients of this 
restricted function have a normalized representative in y . The set also includes vectors λ for which Pλ > HL(P ) for all 
P ∈ y , which do not correspond to supporting hyperplanes.
Not all vectors λ ∈ y may be available to the contestant as responses to a play of y ∈ Y by the quizmaster. As a trivial 
example, consider logarithmic loss and a vector λ with 
∑
x∈y e−λx < 1 and λx = 0 for x /∈ y. Then λ ∈ y because the 
hyperplane defined by λ is dominating to HL  y (thus the expected loss from λ is larger than what the contestant could 
achieve), but clearly there is no distribution Q ∈ X that results in these losses on x ∈ y. We say that a vector λ ∈ y is 
realizable on y if there exists a Q ∈ X such that L(x, Q ) = λx for all x ∈ y, and then we say that such a Q realizes λ.
A partial order on vectors λ, λ′ ∈ RX is given by: λ ≤ λ′ if and only if λx ≤ λ′x for all x ∈X . We write λ < λ′ when λ ≤ λ′
and λ = λ′ . For all y ∈ Y , this partial order has the following property: For λ, λ′ ∈ y , we have λ ≤ λ′ if and only if for 
all P ∈ y , Pλ ≤ Pλ′ (since any linear function is maximized over the simplex at a vertex). Therefore if Q , Q ′ ∈ X
realize λ, λ′ ∈ y respectively and λ ≤ λ′ , the contestant is never hurt by using Q instead of Q ′ as a prediction given the 
message y.
Any minimal element with respect to this partial order defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  y . For P in the relative 
interior of y , the converse also holds: all supporting hyperplanes at P are minimal elements. This is not the case for P at 
the relative boundary of y , where some supporting hyperplanes (the ones that ‘tip over’ the boundary) are not minimal.
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1. If λ ∈ y is not a supporting hyperplane to HL  y , then there exists a supporting hyperplane λ′ ∈ y with λ′ < λ;
2. If λ ∈ y is a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at P but is not minimal in y , then there exists a minimal λ′ < λ in y ;
3. If λ ∈ y is a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at P , then any λ′ ≤ λ in y is a supporting hyperplane at P and obeys λ′x = λx
for all x ∈ y with P (x) > 0.
Thus the contestant never needs to play a Q |y realizing a non-minimal element of y .
3.2.2. Existence
With the help of Lemma 4, we can formulate sufficient conditions for the existence of a worst-case optimal strategy Q ∗
for the contestant that, together with P∗ for the quizmaster, forms a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (Existence of Q ∗). Suppose that HL is finite and continuous and that for all y ∈ Y , all minimal supporting hyperplanes 
λ ∈ y to HL  y are realizable on y. Then there exists a worst-case optimal strategy Q ∗ ∈Q for the contestant that achieves the 
same expected loss in the minimax game as P∗ achieves in the maximin game: (P∗, Q ∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
We will see in Theorem 9 that a (or rather, at least one) Nash equilibrium exists for logarithmic loss and Brier loss. The 
existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with randomized 0–1 loss is shown by the following consequence of Theorem 5.
Proposition 6. In games with randomized 0–1 loss, a Nash equilibrium exists.
The following example shows what may go wrong if some supporting hyperplanes are not realizable.
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/6 1/6 –
y2 – 1/6 1/6
y3 1/6 – 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
Example F (Hard 0–1 loss). Consider the game with X , Y and p as shown in the table, and with
hard 0–1 loss (so that the contestant is not allowed to randomize):
L(x, Q ) =
{
0 if Q (x) = 1;
1 otherwise.
This loss function has the same entropy function as randomized 0–1 loss, so the two loss func-
tions are the same from the quizmaster’s perspective. The table shows the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the 
quizmaster, with KT-vector λ∗ = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) and expected loss 1/2. For randomized 0–1 loss, the (as we will see below: 
unique) worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant would be to respond to any message y with the uniform distribution 
on y. However, for all y ∈ Y , λ given by λx = 1x∈yλ∗x is not realizable on y under hard 0–1 loss, so Theorem 5 does not 
apply. In fact, for any strategy Q the contestant might use, there exists a strategy P for the quizmaster that gives expected 
loss 2/3 or larger (because for at least two outcomes x, there must be a y  x such that L(x, Q |y) = 1). Thus the inequal-
ity (7) is strict: there is no Nash equilibrium, and a worst-case optimal strategy for either player is optimal only in the 
minimax/maximin sense.
This example also shows that the condition on existence of supporting hyperplanes in Theorem 5 cannot be replaced by 
the weaker condition that the infimum appearing in the definition (4) of HL is always attained.
Games without Nash equilibria We will now briefly go into the situation seen in the preceding example, where Theorem 5
does not apply.
While for some games with L hard 0–1 loss, no Nash equilibrium may exist, worst-case optimal strategies for the 
contestant do exist, and can be characterized using stable sets of a graph. A stable set is a set of nodes no two of which are 
adjacent [21, Chapter 64]. Consider the graph with node set X and with an edge between two nodes if and only if they 
occur together in some message. A set S ⊆ X is stable in this graph if and only if there exists a strategy Q ∈ Q for the 
contestant such that for all x ∈ S , maxy∈Y :x∈y L(x, Q |y) = 0, and equal to 1 otherwise. The worst-case loss obtained by this 
strategy is 1 −∑x∈S px . Thus finding the worst-case optimal strategy Q for the contestant is equivalent to finding a stable 
set S with maximum weight. Algorithmically, this is an NP-hard problem in general, though polynomial-time algorithms 
exist for certain classes of graphs, including perfect (this includes bipartite) graphs and claw-free graphs [21].
With the exception of two examples in Section 4.1 illustrating the limits of our theory, we will not look at games without 
Nash equilibria any more from now on.
3.2.3. Characterization and nonuniqueness
The concept of a KT-vector, which helped characterize worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster in Theorem 3, 
now returns for a similar role in the characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
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realizable), a strategy Q ∗ ∈Q is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the vector given by λx := maxyx L(x, Q ∗|y) is a 
KT-vector.
If the loss L(x, Q ∗|y) equals λx for all x ∈ y, then the worst-case optimal strategy Q ∗ is an equalizer strategy [19]: the 
expected loss of Q ∗ does not depend on the quizmaster’s strategy. Not all games have an equalizer strategy as worst-case 
optimal strategy, as Example H below shows.
The following examples demonstrate that a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant is in general not unique.
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 * * – –
y2 – * * –
y3 – – * *
y4 * – – *
px 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Example G (λ∗ not unique). Consider the game with X , Y and p as in the table to the right,
and with randomized 0–1 loss. For the quizmaster, any P∗ that is uniform given each y is 
worst-case optimal, and any λa = (a, 1 − a, a, 1 − a) with a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector. To each 
λa corresponds a unique worst-case optimal Q ∗ , namely the strategy that puts conditional 
probability 1 − a on outcome x1 or x3 (whichever is in the given message), and probability 
a on x2 or x4.
Note that if we replace randomized 0–1 loss by a strictly proper loss function such as 
logarithmic or Brier loss, the KT-vector and the worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant become unique, while the 
same set of strategies as before continues to be worst-case optimal for the quizmaster. This shows that the freedom for the 
contestant we see here for randomized 0–1 loss is due to the nonuniqueness of the KT-vector, not due to the nonuniqueness 
of P∗ .
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/5 3/10 –
y2 – 3/10 1/5
y3 0 – 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
Example H (Minimal λ not unique). Consider the game as shown in the table with logarithmic
loss; the strategy P∗ shown in this table is the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quiz-
master. Because logarithmic loss is proper, we know that Q ∗|y1 = P∗(· | y1) and Q ∗|y2 = P∗(· | y2)
are optimal responses for the contestant, but this does not tell us what Q ∗|y3 should be in a 
worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant.
We see that P∗ assigns probability zero to message y3, and the KT-vector
λ∗ = (− log 2
5
,− log 3
5
,− log 2
5
)
specifies a hyperplane that does not support HL in y3 . Hence the construction of Q
∗|y3 in the proof of Theorem 5
allows freedom in the choice of a minimal element λ ∈ y3 less than (− log2/5, 0, − log2/5): the valid choices are 
(− logq, 0, − log(1 − q)) for any q ∈ [2/5, 3/5]; each of these is realized on y3 by Q |y3 = (q, 0, 1 − q). Using Theorem 7, 
we can verify that these choices of Q ∗|y3 define worst-case optimal strategies: the vector λ defined there equals the KT-
vector λ∗ given above.
This also shows that worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant cannot be characterized simply as ‘optimal re-
sponses to P∗ ’: in this example, P∗(· | y3) is undefined, yet there is a nontrivial constraint on Q |y3 in the worst-case 
optimal strategy Q for the contestant.
4. Results for well-behaved loss functions
In the preceding sections, we have established characterization results for the worst-case optimal strategies of both play-
ers. While these results are applicable to many loss functions, they have the disadvantage of being complicated, involving 
supporting hyperplanes. For some common loss functions, simpler characterizations can be given.
4.1. Proper continuous loss functions
Recall from page 34 that for a proper loss function, the contestant’s expected loss for a given message is minimized 
if his predicted probabilities equal the true probabilities. Such loss functions are natural to consider in our probability 
updating game, as our goal will often be to find these true probabilities. However, simplifying our theorems requires further 
restrictions on the class of loss functions. In this subsection, we consider loss functions that are both proper and continuous.
Lemma 8. If the loss function L(x, Q ) is proper and continuous as a function of Q for all x and HL is finite, then HL is differentiable 
in the following sense: for all y ∈ Y and all P ∈ y , there is at most one element of y that is a minimal supporting hyperplane to 
HL  y at P ; if P is in the relative interior of y , there is exactly one. If it exists, the minimal supporting hyperplane at P is realized 
by Q |y = P .
The uniqueness of minimal supporting hyperplanes in y is equivalent to there being exactly one equivalence class 
of supergradients, where supergradients are taken to be equivalent if their corresponding supporting hyperplanes coincide 
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says that for a finite, concave function such as HL , uniqueness of the supergradient at P is equivalent to differentiability 
at P .
Theorem 9. For L proper and continuous and HL finite and continuous,
1. worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and form a Nash equilibrium;
2. there is a unique KT-vector;
3. a strategy P∗ ∈P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists λ∗ ∈ RX such that
L(x, P∗(· | y)) = λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) > 0,
L(x, P∗(· | y)) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) = 0, P∗(y) > 0, and
∃Q ∗|y : L(x, Q ∗|y) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(y) = 0;
4. a strategy Q ∗ for the contestant is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists a worst-case optimal P∗ such that for all x,
max
yx L(x, Q
∗|y) = maxyx,
P∗(y)>0
L(x, P∗(· | y)), (9)
which holds if and only if (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗.
Using this theorem, many observations made about logarithmic loss and Brier loss in the examples we have seen so far 
can now be more easily verified. For instance, in the worst-case optimal strategy we saw in Example E on page 40, we verify 
that L(x2, P∗(· | y2)) = 1.5 ≤ 1.62 = λ∗x2 = L(x2, P∗(· | y1)).
Theorem 9 requires that L is both proper and continuous. If either condition is removed then the conclusions of the 
theorem may fail to hold. Counterexamples for either case where no Nash equilibrium exists are given by Van Ommen 
[1, Examples 6.J and 6.K].
While uniqueness of λ∗ was established by the theorem, we do not have uniqueness of P∗ or Q ∗ . Multiple worst-case 
optimal strategies Q ∗ for the contestant may exist as soon as a message is unused, as in Example H. Multiple worst-case 
optimal strategies P∗ for the quizmaster are also possible, even for strictly proper L: see Example G. The worst-case op-
timality criterion does not provide any guidance for selecting particular strategies in such cases. One might make use of 
symmetry and/or various kinds of limits to select a specific recommendation, or search for an analogue of subgame perfect 
equilibria. We will leave such interesting extensions to future research.
4.2. Local loss functions
Logarithmic loss is an example of a local loss function: a loss function where the loss L(x, Q ) depends on the probability 
assigned by the prediction Q to the obtained outcome x, but not on the probabilities assigned to outcomes that did not 
occur. The following theorem shows how for such loss functions, worst-case optimality of the quizmaster’s strategy can be 
characterized purely in terms of probabilities, without converting them to losses.
Theorem 10 (Characterization of P∗ for local L). For L local and proper and HL finite and continuous, P∗ ∈P is worst-case optimal if 
there exists a vector q ∈ [0, 1]X such that
qx = P∗(x | y) for all y ∈ Y , x ∈ y with P∗(y > 0), and∑
x∈y
qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y. (10)
If additionally HL  y is strictly concave for all y ∈Y , only such P∗ are worst-case optimal for L.
Among loss functions that are ‘smooth’ for all x, logarithmic loss is, up to some transformations, the only proper local 
loss function [22]. We do not know what non-smooth local proper loss functions may exist. In particular, it is conceivable 
(yet unlikely) that a discontinuous L exists satisfying the conditions of Theorem 10, but not those of Theorem 9.
If L is also continuous, then Theorem 9 applies, and it follows that Q ∗ ∈Q is a worst-case optimal strategy for the con-
testant if Q ∗|y(x) ≥ qx for all y ∈ Y , x ∈ y. For strictly proper loss functions such as logarithmic loss, this fully characterizes 
the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
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y1 1/5 3/10 –
y2 – 3/10 1/5
y3 0 – 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
Example H (continued). Consider again the game shown to the right with logarithmic loss. The
conditionals P∗(x | y) agree with the vector q = (2/5, 3/5, 2/5). For all y ∈ Y with P∗(y) > 0, this 
implies that 
∑
x∈y qx = 1; for y3, we see that this sum equals 4/5 ≤ 1. Thus P∗ is verified to be 
worst-case optimal.
The equality of conditionals P∗(x | y) with the same x in the statement of Theorem 10 is 
oddly similar to the CAR condition we saw in Section 1, but reversing the roles of outcomes and messages. We may say 
that a strategy P∗ satisfying (10) is RCAR (sometimes with vector q), for ‘reverse CAR’. Note that whether a strategy is RCAR 
does not depend on the loss function.
A vector q is called an RCAR vector if a strategy P∗ ∈ P exists such that P∗ and q satisfy (10). This definition is also 
independent of the loss function. If q is an RCAR vector, then qx > 0 for all x ∈X ; otherwise we would get P∗(x) = 0 < px . 
Like the KT-vector λ∗ in Theorem 9, the RCAR vector is unique:
Lemma 11. Given X , Y , p, there exists a unique RCAR vector q ∈ [0, 1]X .
If each message in Y contains an outcome x not contained in any other message, then any strategy P∗ must have 
P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y . Then the first line of (10) implies that ∑x∈y qx = 1 for all y. Thus the second line is now satisfied 
automatically, allowing the theorem to be simplified for this case:
Corollary 12. A strategy P∗ ∈P with P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈Y that satisfies
P∗(x | y) = P∗(x | y′) for all y, y′  x (11)
is worst-case optimal for the loss functions covered by Theorem 10.
In this case, P∗ is an equalizer strategy [19].
The symmetry between versions of CAR and RCAR is clearest in Corollary 12: the condition (11) is the mirror image of 
the definition of strong CAR in Jaeger [8]. Thus we may call it strong RCAR. Ordinary RCAR (10) imposes an inequality on q
for messages with probability 0, which has no analogue in the CAR literature that we know of: the definition of weak CAR
in [8] puts no requirement at all on outcomes with probability 0.
Strict concavity of HL occurred as a new condition in Theorem 10. The main loss function of interest here is logarithmic 
loss, and its entropy is strictly concave. For other loss functions, the following lemma relates strict concavity of HL to 
conditions we have seen before.
Lemma 13. If L is strictly proper and all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ y to HL  y are realizable on y for all y ∈ Y , then 
HL is strictly concave on HL  y for all y ∈Y .
Affine transformations of the loss function Previously, we mentioned that logarithmic loss is the only local proper loss function 
up to some transformations. The transformations considered in Bernardo [22] are affine transformations, of the form
L′(x, Q ) = aL(x, Q ) + bx (12)
for a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX . (This transformation can result in a function L′ that can take negative values, so that it does not 
satisfy our definition of a loss function. However, our results can easily be extended to loss functions bounded from below 
by an arbitrary real number, so we allow such transformations here.)
The following lemma shows that, for logarithmic loss as well as for other loss functions, the transformation (12) does 
not change how the players of the probability updating game should act.
Lemma 14. Let L be a loss function for which HL is finite and continuous, and let L′ be an affine transformation of L as in (12). 
Then a strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in the game G′ := (X , Y, p, L′) if and only if P∗ is worst-case optimal in 
G := (X , Y, p, L). If G also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5, then the same equivalence holds for worst-case optimal strategies 
Q ∗ for the contestant.
Lemma 14 has highly important implications when applied to the logarithmic loss. While multiplying logarithmic loss 
by a constant a = 1 merely corresponds to changing the base of the logarithm, adding constants bx allows the logarithmic 
loss to become the appropriate loss function for a very wide class of games. This means that the RCAR characterization 
of worst-case optimal strategies for logarithmic loss is also valid for all these games. We are referring to so-called Kelly 
gambling games, also known as horse race games [23] in the literature. In such games (with terminology adapted to our 
setting), for any outcome x the contestant can buy a ticket which costs ¤1 and which pays off a positive amount ¤cx
if x actually obtains; if some x′ = x is realized, nothing is paid so the ¤1 is lost. The contestant is allowed to distribute 
his capital over several tickets (outcomes), and he is also allowed to buy a fractional nonnegative number of tickets. For 
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capital fifty–fifty over both outcomes.
Now consider a contestant with some initial capital (say, ¤1), who faces an i.i.d. sequence (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . ∼ P of 
outcomes in X × Y . At each point in time i he observes ‘side information’ Yi = yi and he distributes his capital gained 
so far over all x ∈ X , putting some fraction Q |yi (x) of his capital on outcome x. Then he is paid out according to the xi
that was actually realized. Here each Q |y is a probability distribution over X , i.e. for all y ∈ Y , all x ∈ X , Q |y(x) ≥ 0 and ∑
x∈X Q |y(x) = 1. So if his capital was Ui before the i-th round, it will be Ui · Q |yi (xi)cxi after the i-th round. By the 
law of large numbers, his capital will grow (or shrink, depending on the odds on offer) almost surely exponentially fast, 
with exponent EX,Y∼P [log Q |Y (X)cX ] = EX,Y∼P [log Q |Y (X) − bX ], where bx = − log cx [23, Chapter 6]. Thus, the contestant’s 
capital will grow fastest, among all constant strategies and against an adversarial distribution P ∈P , if he plays a worst-case 
optimal strategy for gains log Q (x) −bx , i.e. for loss function L′(x, Q ) = − log Q (x) +bx . By Lemma 14 above, this worst-case 
optimal strategy Q ∗ is just the Q ∗ that is also worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss — it does not depend on the pay-offs
(‘odds’ in the horse race interpretation) cx . Clearly, if data are i.i.d. then this continues to hold even if the pay-offs are 
allowed to change over time, and even if the contestant is allowed to use different strategies at different time points: the 
worst-case optimal capital growth rate is always achieved by choosing Q ∗ at all time points.
The upshot is that whenever (a) the probability updating game is played repeatedly, and (b) the contestant is allowed to 
reinvest and redistribute his capital over all outcomes at each point in time, then his worst-case optimal strategy is equal 
to the worst-case optimal Q ∗ for logarithmic loss irrespective of the pay-offs. This makes the logarithmic loss, and hence the 
RCAR characterization, appropriate for a very wide class of settings.
5. The RCAR characterization for general loss functions
Our results so far have focused on properties of the loss function L. This section will focus on understanding a game’s 
message structure Y . For the purpose of summarizing our main theorems in simplified form, we restrict attention to irre-
ducible games. Those are games which are connected (a game is disconnected if the outcome space can be partitioned such 
that each message is contained within one of the parts) and contain no dominated messages (a message is dominated if 
it is a strict subset of another message). We say that a game is a graph game (Section 5.3) if all its messages are binary, 
and we call it a matroid game (Section 5.4) if its messages satisfy the basis exchange property [24, Corollary 1.2.5] detailed 
below. The abstract matroid property holds for a rich class of games, including e.g. negation games, where each message 
excludes a single outcome. Monty Hall (Example B) is both a graph and a matroid game. We also need a mild condition 
on loss functions. We call a loss function regular if it is invariant under permutations of the outcomes, and has finite and 
continuous associated entropy function HL .
To solve a quizmaster-contestant game, we are typically looking for a Nash equilibrium (saddle point strategy pair). 
In general, not only the contestant’s optimal response but also the optimal quizmaster strategy will depend on the loss 
function. This dependence renders probability updating an application-dependent endeavour. Our main result in this section 
is that for an important class of games (and only these) the optimal quizmaster strategy is independent of the loss function. 
For these cases we derive a probability update rule that is application independent, like standard probability conditioning, 
but that applies much more broadly. The following is the summary result of this section (the precise statements can be 
found in Theorems 18, 19 and 20).
Theorem 15. Fix an irreducible game with set of messages Y . Then
Y is a graph 
or a matroid
iff 
for any marginal on outcomes, the worst-case 
optimal strategy for the quizmaster is identical 
for all regular loss functions
We first show a simple method of simplifying message structures in Section 5.1; there we will also see that if Y is a 
partition of X , naive conditioning is worst-case optimal. In Section 5.2, we consider symmetry properties that worst-case 
optimal strategies must have, provided that the loss function also obeys a form of symmetry. Then in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, 
we show two classes of message structures for which the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be charac-
terized by the RCAR condition (10). This is the condition that also characterizes worst-case optimal strategies for local loss 
functions and for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs (by Theorem 10 and Lemma 14); the results in this section show 
that the same characterization sometimes holds for a much more general class of loss functions. This leads to an interesting 
property of those (and only those) message structures, discussed in Section 5.5: the same strategy P∗ will be optimal for 
the quizmaster regardless of the loss function.
We will look at the game from the perspective of the quizmaster, and consider worst-case optimal strategies P ∗ for 
him. In games for which a Nash equilibrium exists, the contestant’s worst-case optimal strategies can be found easily 
once we know P∗ and a KT-vector certifying its optimality as in Theorem 3: given a KT-vector, Q ∗ can be constructed 
message-by-message to satisfy the condition in Theorem 7. This is even easier in the case of proper loss functions, where 
for each y with P∗(y) > 0, an optimal response is simply Q ∗ = P∗(· | y). Another advantage of looking at the game from the |y
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characterizing worst-case optimal Q ∗ .
5.1. Decomposition of games
For some message structures, regardless of the marginal and loss function, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal 
strategy for the quizmaster can be solved by considering a smaller message structure instead. It will be useful to look at 
such simplifications first, so that in the coming sections we will only need to deal with message structures that have already 
been simplified.
We have already seen one example of the type of result we are looking for earlier, in Lemma 2 on page 38, where we 
saw that if a message is dominated by another (meaning that it is a subset of the other), then the quizmaster always has a 
worst-case optimal strategy that assigns probability 0 to the dominated message. In this subsection, we introduce a second 
simplification, by means of decomposition into connected components.
Connectivity is a fundamental concept from graph theory. However, in general, our message structures are not graphs, 
but hypergraphs. Like an ordinary graph, a hypergraph is defined by a set of nodes and a set of edges, but the edges are 
allowed to be arbitrary subsets of the nodes; in a graph, all edges must contain exactly two nodes. Thus for a probability 
updating game, we can talk about the hypergraph (X , Y), having the outcomes as its nodes and the messages as its edges.
The terminology of connectivity can be generalized from graphs to hypergraphs [15]. We will say that a game is con-
nected if its underlying hypergraph is connected. This leads to the following definitions.
If for some game G = (X , Y, p, L), there is a set ∅  S  X such that for each message y, either y ⊆ S or y ⊆ X \ S , 
then the game can be decomposed into two games G1 = (X1, Y1, p(1), L) and G2 = (X2, Y2, p(2), L) with X1 = S , X2 =X \ S , 
Yi = {y ∈Y | y ⊆Xi}, and p(i)(x) = p(x)/ ∑x′∈Xi p(x′). If no such set S exists, we say the game G is connected.
Lemma 16 (Decomposition). If a game G can be decomposed into G1 and G2 as described above, and its loss function L is such that HL
is finite and continuous and HL(P ) = infQ ∈y
∑
x∈y P (x)L(x, Q ) for each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ y , then a strategy P∗ is worst-case 
optimal for the quizmaster in G if and only if there exist worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster P∗1 and P∗2 in G1 and G2
respectively such that
P∗(x, y) =
{
P∗1(x, y) ·
∑
x′∈X1 p(x
′) for x ∈X1;
P∗2(x, y) ·
∑
x′∈X2 p(x
′) for x ∈X2.
(The extra condition on L is necessary to exclude some ‘very improper’ loss functions: those that reward the contestant 
for predicting outcomes known to have probability 0.) In particular, if the messages of G form a partition of X , then G can 
be decomposed into games that each contain only one message. In a game G of this form, the quizmaster has only one 
strategy to choose from. If the loss function is proper, naive conditioning is an optimal response to this strategy, and thus 
worst-case optimal.
Together with Lemma 2, this lemma allows us to reduce any game in which we want to find a worst-case optimal 
strategy for the quizmaster to a set of connected games containing no dominated messages. These reduced games will not 
contain any messages of size one, unless one of the games consists of only that message: a message of size one is either 
dominated, or it forms a trivial component containing no other messages.
5.2. Outcome symmetry
Sometimes, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is simplified because certain ‘symmetry’ properties of 
the message structure and loss function allow us to conclude that worst-case optimal strategies satisfying an additional 
condition must have the same symmetries.
5.2.1. Symmetry of loss functions
We now briefly return to the topic of loss functions to define a property we will need next. For a probability distribution 
Q ∈ X and x1, x2 distinct elements of X , define Q x1↔x2 as
Q x1↔x2(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Q (x2) for x= x1;
Q (x1) for x= x2;
Q (x) otherwise,
and similarly for a contestant’s strategy Q ∈ Q by applying this transformation to the conditional for each y. We say L
is symmetric between x1 and x2 if for all Q ∈ X , we have L(x1, Q ) = L(x2, Q x1↔x2 ) and L(x, Q ) = L(x, Q x1↔x2 ) for all 
x ∈X \ {x1, x2}. If L is symmetric between x1 and x2 and between x2 and x3, then it is also symmetric between x1 and x3, 
because ((Q x1↔x2 )x2↔x3 )x1↔x2 = Q x1↔x3 . In words: we can apply the first symmetry, then the second, then the first again 
to find that we have exchanged x1 and x3. We also consider any loss function to be symmetric between x and x for any x. 
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S ⊆X , meaning that all pairs of elements of that set can be exchanged. If L is symmetric on X , we say it is fully symmetric.
The loss functions we have seen so far were fully symmetric. The affine transformations of loss functions discussed 
at the end of Section 4.2 may change the symmetries of a loss function, while they do not change which strategies are 
worst-case optimal for the two players. This means that sometimes, an asymmetric loss function can be transformed into 
an essentially equivalent loss function with better symmetry properties. Yet not all loss functions can be transformed this 
way. The following two examples are about loss functions exhibiting this kind of inherent asymmetry.
Example I (Matrix loss). Given a [0, ∞)-valued X ×X matrix of losses A, define hard matrix loss by
L(x, Q ) =
{
Ax,x′ if Q (x′) = 1 for some x′;
∞ otherwise.
This generalizes hard 0–1 loss, which is obtained for the matrix A with zeroes on the diagonal and ones elsewhere (except 
that the definition above may give infinite loss for some Q , but a rational contestant would never use such Q ). It is 
symmetric between x1 and x2 if and only if swapping row x1 with x2 and column x1 with x2 results in matrix A again; 
that is, if and only if Ax1,x1 = Ax2,x2 , Ax1,x2 = Ax2,x1 , Ax′,x1 = Ax′,x2 , and Ax1,x′ = Ax2,x′ , for all x′ ∈X \ {x1, x2}.
We can also define randomized matrix loss as an analogous generalization of randomized 0–1 loss, by taking an expec-
tation over Q in hard matrix loss:
L(x, Q ) =
∑
x′∈X
Q (x′)Ax,x′ .
It has the same symmetry properties as hard matrix loss. The proof of Proposition 6 also applies to randomized matrix loss 
without modification, showing that a Nash equilibrium exists in games using this loss function.
Example J (Skewed logarithmic loss). Fix a vector c ∈ RX≥0, and define the function F : X → R≥0 by
F (P ) := −
∑
x∈X
cx P (x) log P (x).
This is a sum of differentiable concave functions, and therefore differentiable and concave; if c ∈ RX>0, it is strictly concave 
(in fact, it is also strictly concave if c contains a single 0). We use the construction of Bregman scores in Grünwald and Dawid 
[14, Section 3.5.4] to construct a proper loss function L having F as its generalized entropy, and find
L(x, Q ) = F (Q ) + (ex − Q ) · ∇ F (Q ) = −cx(1+ log Q (x)) +
∑
x′∈X
cx′ Q (x
′),
where ex is the distribution that puts all mass on x. This loss function is strictly proper if HL is strictly concave. Unlike 
logarithmic loss and its affine transformations, it is not local for |X | > 2. Also, it is not generally fully symmetric, but is 
symmetric between pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈X with cx1 = cx2 .
5.2.2. Symmetry of KT-vectors
Using the definition of symmetry of loss functions introduced in the previous section, we can now state the following 
lemma.
Lemma 17 (Loss exchange). Consider a game with y1, y2 ∈ Y , y1 \ y2 = {x1}, y2 \ y1 = {x2}, HL finite and continuous and L
symmetric between x1 and x2 . If a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmaster exists with P∗(x1, y1) > 0, then all KT-vectors 
λ∗ satisfy λ∗x1 ≤ λ∗x2 (so if in addition P∗(x2, y2) > 0 then λ∗x1 = λ∗x2 ).
When two messages y1, y2 ∈ Y satisfy y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}, we say that they differ by the exchange of one 
outcome.
It will be useful to have a term for the symmetry conditions on L that allow us to apply Lemma 17 to any pair of 
messages in some set Y ′ ⊆ Y satisfying the statement of the lemma. We say L is symmetric with respect to exchanges in 
Y ′ if L is symmetric between any pair of outcomes x1, x2 such that messages y1, y2 ∈ Y ′ exist with y1 \ y2 = {x1} and 
y2 \ y1 = {x2}.
We saw in Theorem 10 that for logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster can be characterized in 
terms of a simple condition, the RCAR condition (10). We also saw that sometimes (in Examples B and C on page 39, but not 
in Example D), those same strategies were also worst-case optimal for other loss functions. This suggests that even for some 
types of games where Theorem 10 does not apply, it is possible to recognize worst-case optimal strategies using the easily 
verifiable RCAR condition. We show that there are two classes of message structures in which this is possible regardless of 
the marginal, and explore the consequences in Section 5.5.
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5.3. Graph games
The first of these classes consist of all message structures Y for which each message contains at most two outcomes. 
After removing singleton messages (which are either dominated or are decomposable from the rest of the game), we have 
|y| = 2 for all y ∈ Y . This corresponds to a simple undirected graph (that is, a graph containing no loops or multiple edges) 
with a node for each outcome in X and an edge for each message in Y . For this reason, a game where each message in Y
contains at most two outcomes is called a graph game. Many games we saw in previous examples were graph games. Their 
underlying graphs are shown in Fig. 4.
Theorem 18 (RCAR for graph games). If each message in Y contains at most two outcomes and P∗ ∈ P is an RCAR strategy, then P∗
is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in {y ∈Y | |y| = 2} with HL finite and continuous. If additionally 
HL is strictly concave, only such P∗ are worst-case optimal for L.
The statement of the theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 10 in Section 4.2, and the restrictions on L in the 
present theorem (except for symmetry) were also seen in the previous theorem. Sufficient conditions for these restrictions 
to hold were given by Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 (HL finite and continuous) and Lemma 13 in Section 4.2 (strict concavity 
of HL ).
The intuition behind the proof is that for binary predictions Q , the probability assigned by Q to one outcome determines 
the probability Q assigns to the other outcome. Thus all loss functions are essentially local when used to assess such 
predictions, and their behaviour is similar to logarithmic loss.
5.4. Matroid games
The other class is that of matroid games. A matroid over a finite ground set X can be defined by a nonempty family Y
of subsets of X (the bases of the matroid) satisfying the basis exchange property [24, Corollary 1.2.5]: for all y1, y2 ∈ Y and 
x1 ∈ y1 \ y2,
(y1 \ {x1}) ∪ {x2} ∈ Y for some x2 ∈ y2 \ y1. (13)
In words, for any pair of messages, if an outcome that is not in the second message is removed from the first message, it 
must be possible to replace it by an outcome from the second message that is not in the first message, in such a way that 
the resulting set of outcomes is again a message.
A matroid game is a game in which Y is the set of bases of a matroid. The Monty Hall game (Example B) is a matroid 
game: taking one of the two messages and replacing the outcome unique to it by the only other outcome will result in the 
other message. By our definition of a game, it is required in addition to (13) that each element of the ground set X of the 
matroid occurs in some basis.
Many alternative characterizations of matroids exist. For example, a matroid with ground set X and bases Y can also be 
represented by its family of independent sets I = {I ⊆X | I ⊆ y for some y ∈ Y}, and a different set of axioms analogous to 
(13) characterizes whether a given set I is the family of independent sets of some matroid.
The concept of a matroid was introduced by Whitney [25] to study the abstract properties of the notion of dependence, 
as seen for example in linear algebra and graph theory (explained below). Different characterizations of the concept, applied 
to different examples, were given independently by other authors, but then turned out to be equivalent to matroids. One 
field where matroids play an important role is combinatorial optimization. We refer to Schrijver [21, Section 39.10b] for 
extensive historical notes.
We give two example classes of matroids, taken from Schrijver [21, Section 39.4]:
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that the set of column vectors with index in I is linearly independent. Then I is the family of independent sets of a 
matroid. A subset that spans the column space of A is a basis of this matroid.
• Given a simple undirected graph G , let X be its set of edges and I consist of all acyclic subsets of X . Then I is 
the family of independent sets of a matroid. This matroid is called the cycle matroid of G . The bases are the maximal 
independent sets; if G is connected, these are its spanning trees.
One interesting class of games for which Y are the bases of a matroid is the class of negation games. In such a game, 
each element of Y is of the form X \ {x} for some x. (Not all sets of this form need to be in Y .) Thus the quizmaster will 
tell the contestant, “The true outcome is not x,” as in the original Monty Hall problem where one of the three doors is 
opened to reveal a goat. A family Y of this form satisfies (13) trivially: for y1, y2 distinct elements of Y , there is only one 
choice for each of x1 and x2, and with these choices we get (y1 \ {x1}) ∪ {x2} = y2 ∈Y .
Another class of matroids is formed by the uniform matroids, in which every set of some fixed size k is a basis. These also 
have a natural interpretation when they occur as the message structure of a game: the quizmaster is allowed to leave any 
set of k doors shut.
As the following theorem shows, matroid games share with graph games the property that RCAR strategies are worst-case 
optimal for a wide variety of loss functions.
Theorem 19 (RCAR for matroid games). If Y are the bases of a matroid and P∗ ∈P is an RCAR strategy, then P∗ is worst-case optimal 
for all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in Y with HL finite and continuous. If additionally HL is strictly concave, only such P∗
are worst-case optimal for L.
5.5. Loss invariance
We saw in the preceding sections that in graph and matroid games, worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster 
are characterized by the RCAR property. This property does not depend on what loss function is used in the game (though 
the theorems do put some conditions on the loss function, such as some symmetry requirements). Consequently, in such 
games, strategies exist that are worst-case optimal regardless of what loss function is used (at least, for a large class of loss 
functions). We call this phenomenon loss invariance.
For such message structures, we can really think of the worst-case optimal strategies as ‘conditioning’ (as a purely 
probability-based operation) rather than as worst-case optimal strategies for some game. This conditioning operation can be 
seen as the generalization of naive conditioning to message structures other than partitions (where naive conditioning gives 
the right answer). Unlike naive conditioning, which requires just the distribution p and the message y to compute P (x | y), 
we also need the message structure Y to compute that conditional probability. But like naive conditioning, we do not need 
to fix a loss function in order to talk about the worst-case optimal prediction of x given a message y.
A subtlety appears when improper loss functions are considered. Our theorems show that the worst-case optimal strate-
gies for the quizmaster are characterized independently of the loss function; however, the worst-case optimal strategies for 
the contestant will not necessarily coincide with these if the loss function is not proper. In this case, loss invariance tells us 
that the loss function does not affect what the contestant should believe about the true outcome, but it may affect how the 
contestant translates this belief into a prediction.
In the cases of graph and matroid games, our analysis of worst-case optimal strategies becomes more widely applicable 
in situations where the probability updating game is really played by two players (as opposed to being a theoretical tool for 
defining safe updating strategies):
• the same strategies continue to be worst-case optimal if the two players use different loss functions (so that the game 
is no longer zero-sum);
• both players will be able to play optimally without knowing the loss function(s) in use.
This is true for the Monty Hall game (Example B), which lies in the intersection of graph and matroid games. This provides 
some justification for the prevailing intuition that the Monty Hall problem should be analysed using probability theory, 
without mention of loss functions.
Theorems 18 and 19 apply only to loss functions that are sufficiently symmetric and for which HL is continuous and 
finite. We make no claim about the question whether RCAR strategies are also worst-case optimal for loss functions that do 
not satisfy these properties. However, note that by Lemma 14, sometimes affine transformations can be used to convert an 
asymmetric loss function into a symmetric one without affecting the players’ strategies.
Lemma 14 also shows that a limited form of loss invariance holds regardless of the message structure. If the players are 
using different affine transformations of the same loss function (for example, of logarithmic loss; this corresponds to Kelly 
gambling where the pay-offs for the contestant are different from those for the quizmaster), both players can play optimally 
without knowing the transformations in use.
An obvious question that remains is: are there any other classes of message structure for which we have loss invariance? 
This is answered in the negative by the following theorem.
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marginal such that no strategy P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal for both logarithmic loss and Brier loss.
6. Conclusion
Conditioning is the method of choice for updating probabilities to incorporate new information. We started by reviewing 
why naive conditioning gives incorrect answers when the set of messages is not a partition of the set of outcomes. For in 
this case the association of messages to outcomes (the coarsening mechanism, or quizmaster strategy) needs to be taken 
into account. In general however, this mechanism is unknown. Previous work showed that conditioning is correct if the 
mechanism satisfies (variants of) the CAR (coarsening at random) condition. In this article we take a different route and 
investigate minimax probability updating strategies that are robust to the worst-case coarsening mechanism. To this end 
we modelled probability updating as a two-player zero sum game between a quizmaster and a contestant. In Section 3
we discussed the optimal strategies for both players, characterizing both the hardest coarsening mechanism (quizmaster 
strategy) and the worst-case optimal way to incorporate new information (contestant strategy). In Section 4 we specialized 
the results to different classes of loss functions. A summary of these theorems was given in Table 1 on page 37. Then 
in Section 5 we investigated graph and matroid games, and show that for these games the worst-case optimal strategy 
does not depend on which loss function is used by both players, so that the updated probabilities are independent of the 
intended application.
6.1. Future work
There are many scenarios in which our results currently do not apply, but to which they might be extended. For example, 
the quizmaster’s hard constraint y  x could be replaced by some soft constraint, so that each message y still carries 
information about the true outcome, but no longer in the form of a subset of X . One way to achieve this might be by affine 
transformations of the loss function as discussed at the end of Section 4.2, but allowing the constants to depend on both x
and y. This could give a worst-case analogue to Jeffrey conditioning or minimum relative entropy updating [4].
Possible extensions would be to infinite outcome and message spaces. We are also interested in probability updating in 
sequential (online) interaction protocols [26].
Other questions concern the comparison between different alternative approaches the contestant might use to update 
his probabilities. For example, can we bound the difference in expected loss between worst-case optimal and naive condi-
tioning? What about ignoring the message and always predicting with the marginal, or ignoring the constraints imposed 
on the quizmaster by the marginal and predicting with the maximum entropy distribution on y? (Both these strategies are 
overly pessimistic.) Conversely, we might wonder how much the contestant loses by playing a worst-case optimal strategy 
when the quizmaster is not adversarial, but for instance chooses from the available messages uniformly at random. In this 
context it is also of interest how to resolve the problem of non-unique worst-case optimal strategies in a principled way.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For finite HL , concavity of HL is shown by Grünwald and Dawid [14, Proposition 3.2], and lower semi-
continuity by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 10.2] (using that the domain of HL is a simplex). If L is finite, then picking any 
Q ∈ X gives an upper bound to HL , so that HL is in particular finite. Concavity now follows by the first claim, and 
continuity by Grünwald and Dawid [14, Corollary 3.3; an important condition is in Corollary 3.2]. 
Proof of Lemma 2. If P (y2) = 0 then P ′ = P and the result is trivial; if P (y2) > 0 but P (y1) = 0, then P (· | y2) = P ′(· | y1)
so P and P ′ have the same expected generalized entropy. Otherwise P (· | y1) and P (· | y2) are well-defined, and P ′(· | y1) =
(P (y1)P (· | y1) + P (y2)P (· | y2))/(P (y1) + P (y2)) is a convex combination of them. By concavity of HL , ∑y P ′(y)HL(P ′(· |
y)) ≥∑y P (y)HL(P (· | y)). 
Proof of Theorem 3. Rockafellar [17, Theorem 27.3] provides conditions under which a convex minimization problem has 
a solution attaining the minimum. These are satisfied by P and −HL : P is nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded (thus 
has no direction of recession), and −HL is convex (Lemma 1), finite for all P ∈P (thus proper), and lower semi-continuous 
(thus closed).
By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 28.2.2], a KT-vector λ∗ exists, so that for the remaining claims of the theorem, it suffices to 
show that P∗ is worst-case optimal and λ∗ is a KT-vector if and only if the given conditions on (P∗, λ∗) hold. To prove this, 
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of P . In this larger set, P (x | y) := P (x, y)/P (y) still defines a conditional probability distribution for y with P (y) > 0, 
because any scale factor cancels out.
The following function extends the quizmaster’s objective function (5) (the expected generalized entropy of P ∈ P) to 
the domain RR(X ,Y)≥0 :
f0(P ) := inf
Q ∈Q
∑
y∈Y,x∈y
P (x, y)L(x, Q |y) =
∑
y∈Y:
P (y)>0
inf
Q |y∈X
∑
x∈y
P (x, y)L(x, Q |y) =
∑
y∈Y:
P (y)>0
P (y)HL(P (· | y)).
Using this concave function (infimum of linear functions), the convex optimization problem is given by
maximize f0(P )
subject to
∑
yx
P (x, y) = px for all x ∈X ,
with P ∈ RR(X ,Y)≥0 . By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 28.3], P∗ ∈ RR(X ,Y)≥0 maximizes this and λ∗ ∈ RX is a KT-vector if and only 
if P∗ ∈P and at P∗ , the zero vector is a supergradient to
f0(P
∗) −
∑
x∈X
λ∗x
(∑
yx
P∗(x, y) − px
)
. (A.1)
The term being subtracted is linear, with gradient λ¯ ∈ RR(X ,Y) given by
λ¯x,y := ∂
∂ P∗(x, y)
∑
x∈X
λ∗x
(∑
yx
P∗(x, y) − px
)
= λ∗x . (A.2)
By Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.8], 0 is a supergradient to (A.1) if and only if λ¯ is a supergradient to f0 at P∗ .
For any P∗ that is not everywhere zero, we have for all c ≥ 0 that f0(cP∗) = cf0(P∗), so that a supporting hyperplane to 
f0 at any P∗ ∈P must go through the origin. Then the supporting hyperplane with gradient λ¯ has as defining equation the 
linear expression 
∑
x,y P (x, y)λ¯x,y .
If 
∑
x,y P (x, y)λ¯x,y defines a supporting hyperplane to f0 at P
∗ , then
1. at every y ∈Y with P∗(y) > 0, it is a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at P∗(· | y), and
2. for every y with P∗(y) = 0, HL(P ′) ≤∑x P ′(x)λ¯x,y for all P ′ ∈ y .
The converse also holds: we have for all y ∈ Y and P ′ ∈ y that HL(P ′) ≤∑x∈y P ′λ¯x,y , with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and 
P ′ = P∗(· | y); taking the convex combination with coefficients P∗(y) shows that the hyperplane defined by ∑x,y P (x, y)λ¯x,y
is nowhere below f0 and touches it at P = P∗ .
For λ¯ of the required form (A.2), this is in turn equivalent to the characterization given in the statement of the theo-
rem. 
Proof of Lemma 4. The function 
∑
x∈y λx P (x) − HL(P ) attains its minimum d on y at some P [17, Theorem 27.3]. Let 
λ′ ∈ y be given by λ′x = λx − d for all x ∈ y: this defines a hyperplane to HL  y that is supporting at the minimizing P , 
proving the first part of the lemma.
For the third part, let λ, λ′ and P be as described. λ′ ≤ λ implies Pλ′ ≤ Pλ. Neither can be smaller than HL(P ), and 
since the right hand side must equal HL(P ) because λ is supporting at P , so must the left hand side, showing that λ′ is also 
supporting at P . If P (x) = 1 for some x ∈ y, then Pλ′′ = λ′′x for any λ′′ , so in particular λ′x = λx = HL(P ). For other P ∈ y , 
we use that two linear functions obeying an inequality on their domain D := {x∈y|P (x)>0} and coinciding at a point in the 
relative interior of D must coincide everywhere on D , so that again λ′x = λx for x ∈ y with P (x) > 0.
It remains to show that given such a λ, a minimal λ′ ≤ λ exists in y . Consider the set ′ := {λ′ ∈ y | λ′ ≤ λ}. The set 
of supporting hyperplanes to HL  y at P in y is closed [17, Section 23, definition subdifferential (page 215)]; ′ is a 
subset of this set (as we just saw), obtained by adding further non-strict linear constraints, so it too is closed. It also has 
the property that if λ′ ∈ ′ is minimal in that set, it is also minimal in y . Now fix any P ′ in the relative interior of y , 
and pick some λ′ ∈ ′ that minimizes P ′λ′ (this minimum must be attained because the expression is bounded below and 
′ is closed). Such a λ′ is also minimal in the partial order, so it is the element we are looking for. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Take a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmaster and KT-vector λ∗ . For each y ∈ Y , define a 
vector
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{
λ∗x for x ∈ y
0 for x /∈ y.
By the statement of Theorem 3, λ′ ∈ y . Let λ be a minimal element of y with λ ≤ λ′: such an element exists by parts 1 
and 2 of Lemma 4. (If λ′ is itself minimal, λ = λ′ .) By assumption, λ is realizable on y. Let Q ∗|y be given by this Q .
By playing this Q ∗ , the contestant will achieve expected loss (against any strategy P ∈P for the quizmaster, for λ∗ any 
KT-vector)∑
x,y
P (x, y)L(x, Q ∗|y) ≤
∑
x,y
P (x, y)λ∗x =
∑
x
pxλ
∗
x .
The right-hand side is the maximum loss the quizmaster can achieve in the maximin game. By (7), the reverse inequality 
also holds, so we find that the values of the minimax and maximin games must be equal. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We first introduce some additional terminology in order to apply a corollary from Rockafellar [17].
A nonvertical hyperplane defined by λ ∈ RX is geometrically a subset of RX × R, namely {(P ′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ = P ′λ}. 
This set is the boundary of the half-space Hλ = {(P ′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ ≤ P ′λ}. A hyperplane λ is supporting to a concave 
function f : RX → R at the point P ∈ RX with f (P ) = Pλ if and only if the hypograph of f is a subset of Hλ .
A column vector (−αλ, α) is called normal to a convex set C at a point (P , z) ∈ C if (P ′ − P , z′ − z)(−αλ, α) ≤ 0 for all 
(P ′, z′) ∈ C [17]; that is, if C ⊆ {(P ′, z′) | (P ′ − P , z′ − z)(−αλ, α) ≤ 0}. This latter set is equal to Hλ if α > 0 and z = Pλ. 
So if C is the hypograph of f and f (P ) = z = Pλ, then λ is a supporting hyperplane to f at P if and only if (−λ, 1) is 
normal to C .
The set of all vectors normal to C at (P , z) is called the normal cone at (P , z). The normal cone to Hλ at given (P , Pλ)
is the half-line {(−αλ, α) | α ∈ [0, ∞)}.
For L randomized 0–1 loss, let the function f0 : RX → R be given by f0(P ) = minQ ∈X
∑
x′∈X P (x′)L(x′, Q ); note that 
f0  X = HL , and that for all y ∈Y , any minimal supporting hyperplane λ ∈ y to HL  y can be extended to a support-
ing hyperplane λ′ to f0 with λ′x = λx for all x ∈ y.
The hypograph of f0 is C =⋂x∈X Hλ(x) , with λ(x)x′ = L(x′, ex) (where ex is the distribution that puts all mass on x). 
By Rockafellar [17, Corollary 23.8.1], for C of this form and (P , z) a point on the boundary of C , the normal cone of C at 
(P , z) is the sum of the individual normal cones. The normal cone of any set at a point in the interior of that set is just {0}, 
so we can ignore those halfspaces when determining the normal cone. Then the corollary says that any vector (−λ, 1)
normal to f0 at (P , f0(P )) can be written as 
∑
x∈X :Pλ(x)= f0(P )(−αxλ(x), αx): λ is a convex combination of those λ(x) .
Conclusion: any minimal supporting hyperplane λ to HL  y at P ∈ y with randomized 0–1 loss is a convex combina-
tion of the hyperplanes realized by hard 0–1 loss that are supporting at P . Therefore, randomizing allows the contestant to 
realize λ. 
Proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 5, we know that a strategy exists for the contestant that achieves loss 
∑
x pxλ
∗
x where 
λ∗ is any KT-vector, and that this is worst-case optimal. Hence Q ∗ is worst-case optimal if and only if it achieves the same 
worst-case expected loss. The worst-case expected loss of a strategy Q ∈Q is
max
P∈P
∑
x,y
P (x, y)L(x, Q |y) =
∑
x
pxmax
yx L(x, Q |y).
Therefore if for all x, y with x ∈ y, we have L(x, Q |y) ≤ λ∗x for some KT-vector λ∗ , Q is worst-case optimal.
For the converse, pick any Q ∈ Q and suppose the vector given by λx := maxy L(x, Q |y) is not a KT-vector. Then by 
Theorem 3, there is no P ∈ P such that P and λ satisfy the conditions of that theorem. Equivalently, for all P ∈ P , there 
either is a message y such that the hyperplane defined by λ passes below HL somewhere in y , or there is a message 
y with P (y) > 0 but the hyperplane lies strictly above HL at P (· | y). The former contradicts the definition of HL , so for 
λ not a KT-vector, the latter must be the case. But then against any P ∈ P (in particular against worst-case optimal P ), 
there is a different strategy Q ′ ∈Q that is equal to Q except for its response to the message y: Q ′|y realizes a supporting 
hyperplane to HL  y at P (· | y). This strategy Q ′ obtains strictly smaller expected loss than Q , so Q is not worst-case 
optimal. (In other words: in a Nash equilibrium (P∗, Q ∗), the contestant can only do worse against P∗ by changing strategy, 
but here he can do better.) 
Proof of Lemma 8. For proper loss functions, L and HL are related as follows: at all y ∈ Y and P ∈ y , if the vector 
λ = L(·, P ) is finite at all x ∈ y, it describes the nonvertical hyperplane realized by P , which is a supporting hyperplane to 
HL  y at P .
Now suppose that at some P ∈ y , there exists a minimal supporting hyperplane λ′ ∈ y other than λ := L(· | P ), the 
supporting hyperplane realized by P (here we allow vertical hyperplanes, for which λ may include infinities). Let x ∈ y be 
an outcome where λ′x < λx , which exists by minimality of λ′ . Write ex for the probability distribution that puts all mass on 
this outcome, and define Pα := (1 − α)P + αex for α ∈ (0, 1]. For each of these points Pα , the hyperplane L(·, Pα) realized 
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supporting), so L(x, Pα) is bounded away from λx by λ′x: L(x, Pα) ≤ λ′x < λx . Therefore limα↓0 L(x, Pα) = L(x, P ), and L is 
not continuous. For L proper and continuous, this proves the ‘at most one’ part of the lemma.
For the ‘exactly one’ part: by Rockafellar [17, Theorem 23.3], a nonvertical supporting hyperplane may only fail to exist 
at P if there is a line segment through P falling inside y on one side of P and outside on the other; that is, for P on the 
relative boundary of y .
Finally, suppose that λ = L(·, P ) (the hyperplane realized by P ) is finite at all x ∈ y but not minimal. Then by Lemma 4, 
a different minimal supporting hyperplane λ′ exists at P , which by the above gives a contradiction. This shows that if λ is 
finite, it is the minimal supporting hyperplane. 
Proof of Theorem 9. Theorem 3 applies, showing existence of a KT-vector and a worst-case optimal strategy for the quiz-
master.
A worst-case optimal Q ∗ exists and forms a Nash equilibrium with P∗: For each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ y , by Lemma 8
there is at most one minimal supporting hyperplane at P which is then realized by Q = P . So all minimal supporting 
hyperplanes are realizable on y, and Theorem 5 applies.
Next we show that the characterization of P∗ and λ∗ in Theorem 3 is equivalent to the one in this theorem. We consider 
y with P∗(y) > 0 first. If P∗ is a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL 
y at P∗(· | y), then by Lemma 4 there exists a minimal λ′ ∈ y which is also supporting at P∗(· | y) and which satisfies 
λ′x ≤ λx for x ∈ y, with equality for P∗(x | y) > 0. By Lemma 8, λ′x = L(·, P∗(· | y)) for all x ∈ y, showing that the conditions 
of this theorem hold. Conversely, if λ∗ satisfies the equality in this theorem, then 
∑
x∈y P∗(x | y)L(x, P (· | y)) = HL(P∗(· | y)), 
so λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane at P∗(· | y).
For y with P∗(y) = 0, if the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is nowhere below HL  y as in Theorem 3, then using Lemma 4
it can be lowered to become a minimal supporting hyperplane, for which a realizing Q ∗|y exists; conversely, the existence of 
a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at Q ∗|y that is nowhere above λ∗ implies that λ∗ is itself nowhere below HL  y .
Uniqueness of the KT-vector: For any worst-case optimal strategy P∗ , the characterization in this theorem puts an equal-
ity constraint on λ∗x for each x, so only one vector can satisfy these conditions. We just saw that these conditions are 
equivalent to those in Theorem 3, so λ∗ is the unique KT-vector.
Characterization of Q ∗: By Theorem 7, Q ∗ is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the (unique) KT-vector 
equals the left-hand side of (9). Similarly, if a strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, then the KT-vector equals 
the right-hand side of (9). Therefore: if for given Q ∗ a worst-case optimal P∗ exists for which (9) holds, then both sides 
equal the KT-vector and Q ∗ is worst-case optimal; if Q ∗ is worst-case optimal, then (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗; 
and if, for given Q ∗ , (9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗ , then it holds for at least one worst-case optimal P∗ by the 
existence of worst-case optimal P∗ . 
Proof of Theorem 10. For local L, by definition L(x, Q ) = fx(Q (x)) for some sequence of functions fx : [0, 1] → [0, ∞]. 
Given a point P ∈ y , the vector λ given by λx = fx(P (x)) defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at P , because L is 
proper. Each fx is nonincreasing. (To see this, consider moving the point P along any line that goes through the vertex of 
the simplex X which puts all mass on some x. Because HL is concave along this line, the farther away P is from that 
vertex, the higher a supporting hyperplane to HL at P will be at that vertex.)
Given P∗ and q satisfying the conditions in this theorem, let λ∗x be fx(qx) for each x ∈X . We show that P∗ is worst-case 
optimal by verifying that P∗ and λ∗ satisfy Theorem 3. For each y with P∗(y) > 0, λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane 
to HL  y at P∗(· | y). For each other y, consider a supporting hyperplane to HL  y at Q |y(x) = qx/ ∑x′∈y qx′ : because 
Q |y(x) ≥ qx , fx(Q |y(x)) ≤ fx(qx) = λ∗x , the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is everywhere at least as high as this supporting 
hyperplane, as required.
For the converse: For strictly concave HL , fx is strictly decreasing. Define functions gx as follows: gx(λx) = inf{q ∈ [0, 1] |
fx(q) ≤ λx}. If fx is continuous, gx is just the ordinary inverse of fx , but if fx has a jump discontinuity at q, there will be 
an interval where gx is constantly equal to q. In either case, gx satisfies gx( fx(q)) = q for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Take P∗ some worst-case optimal strategy, and λ∗ a KT-vector. Define q ∈ [0, 1]X by qx = gx(λ∗x). We use Theorem 3 to 
show that q satisfies (10). For each y ∈ Y , let λ′ ∈ y be a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL  y that obeys λ′ ≤ λ∗; 
such a λ′ exists by Lemma 4. Let Q |y be the (unique) point at which λ′ supports HL  y . It satisfies fx(Q |y(x)) = λ′x , from 
which it follows that gx(λ′x) = gx( fx(Q |y(x))) = Q |y(x). Applying gx to both sides of λ′x ≤ λ∗x , we get Q |y(x) ≥ qx for all x ∈ y, 
so that 
∑
x∈y qx ≤
∑
x∈y Q |y(x) = 1. If P∗(y) > 0, then the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is itself a supporting hyperplane and 
Q |y is the point where it touches HL  y , namely the point P∗(· | y). Because Q |y(x) also satisfies Q |y(x) = gx(λ∗x) = qx , 
the equality qx = Q |y(x) = P∗(x | y) follows. 
Proof of Lemma 11. At least one vector q must exist because for the game with logarithmic loss and X , Y , p as in the 
lemma, a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ must exist by Theorem 3, and an associated RCAR vector q must exist for it by 
Theorem 10 using that HL is strictly concave.
For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q and KT-vector λ∗ are related by λ∗x = − logqx . By Theorem 3, any strategy P ∈P
that does not agree with the KT-vector λ∗ is not worst-case optimal, showing that q is unique. 
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point P ∈ y . By Lemma 4, if a supporting hyperplane exists at P , then a minimum supporting hyperplane also exists at 
that point, so it suffices to restrict our attention to minimal λ ∈ y . We know that such a λ is realizable on y; let Q be a 
distribution realizing it. Then Q minimizes the expected loss against any P at which λ supports HL  y . For strictly proper 
L, there can be at most one such P , proving strict concavity. 
Proof of Lemma 14. The generalized entropy function of L′ is given by
HL′(P ) = aHL(P ) +
∑
x∈X
bxP (x),
where a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX are the constants in the affine transformation (12). HL′ is again finite and continuous. If P∗ is 
worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in game G , then by Theorem 3 there exists a KT-vector λ∗ satisfying that theorem’s 
conditions. Define a transformed vector by λ′ = aλ∗ + b. This is a KT-vector for G′ , showing that P∗ is also worst-case 
optimal in that game.
If the conditions of Theorem 5 hold for G , then they also holds for G′: If λ′ is a minimal supporting hyperplane to 
HL′  y , then λ = (1/a)(λ′ − b) is a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL  y . By assumption, λ is realizable on y in 
game G , say by Q ∈ X . Then the same Q also realizes λ′ in game G′ .
If Q ∗ is worst-case optimal for the contestant in G , then by Theorem 7, λ given by λx :=maxyx L(x, Q ∗|y) is a KT-vector. 
The transformed vector λ′ = aλ + b is then a KT-vector in G′ , so that by Theorem 7, Q ∗ is worst-case optimal in that game.
Because the affine transformation from L into L′ can be reversed by a second affine transformation (with a′ = 1/a and 
b′ = −(1/a)b), the reverse implications follow. 
Proof of Lemma 16. For each y ∈ Y , assume without loss of generality that y ∈ Y1. Then observe that the generalized 
entropies for G and G1 are identical on y ; P∗(y) > 0 if and only if P∗1(y) > 0; and P∗(x | y) = P∗1(x | y) for all x ∈ y. Now 
the claim follows from Theorem 3. 
Proof of Lemma 17. By Theorem 3, λ∗ is supporting to HL  y1 at P∗(· | y1). Define λ1 ∈ y1 equal to λ∗ on y1. Then by 
Lemma 4, any λ′ ∈ y1 with λ′ ≤ λ1 obeys λ′x1 = λ1x1 .
Again by Theorem 3, λ∗ is dominating to HL  y2 . Define λ2 by λ2x = λ∗x for x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ2x1 = λ∗x2 , and 0 elsewhere. 
Because L is symmetric between x1 and x2, λ2 ∈ y1 . For x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ1x = λ2x . If λ2x1 ≤ λ1x1 , then λ2 ≤ λ1; then we must 
have λ2x1 = λ1x1 . So λ2x1 < λ1x1 is impossible, and we find λ∗x1 = λ1x1 ≤ λ2x1 = λ∗x2 . 
Proof of Theorem 18. For graph games, all loss functions are essentially local. We will make this precise by constructing 
functions fx , analogous to those in the proof of Theorem 10: they have the property that for all y ∈ Y , a supporting 
hyperplane to HL  y at P ∈ y is given by λ with λx = fx(P (x)) for all x ∈ y. (Note that we may not get fx(Q (x)) =
L(x, Q ) as in the case of local proper loss functions in the proof of Theorem 10, because the hyperplane realized by Q may 
not be supporting at Q if L is improper.)
For each x ∈ X , if the only message in which x occurs is {x}, then fx(q) is only defined for q = 1, where it is fx(1) =
HL(ex) (where ex is the unique element of y ). For other x, pick any message y ∈ Y with y  x and |y| = 2. For all these y, 
the generalized entropies HL  y are identical copies of the same function, by symmetry of L. For each q ∈ [0, 1], pick a 
supporting hyperplane λ to HL  y at the unique P ∈ y with P (x) = q, and let fx(q) = λx . If HL is not differentiable at P
(including when q ∈ {0, 1}), we can choose a supporting hyperplane arbitrarily as long as the same one is used to define 
fx(q) and fx′ (1 − q) wherever {x, x′} ∈ Y . (In particular this means that if a connected component of Y viewed as a graph 
contains an odd cycle, fx(1/2) must take the same value for all x in that component.)
As for local L, each fx is nonincreasing because HL is concave, and fx is strictly decreasing if HL is strictly concave. The 
rest of the proof is the same as for Theorem 10. 
Proof of Theorem 19. We know from Theorem 10 that a quizmaster strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss 
if and only if it is RCAR, and from Theorem 3 that such a P∗ exists. Take any such P∗ . Let λ be the KT-vector with respect 
to logarithmic loss, and YP∗ = {y ∈ Y | P∗(y) > 0}. For any pair y ∈ YP∗ , y′ ∈ Y , we will show that there exists a bijection 
π from y \ y′ to y′ \ y such that λx ≤ λπ(x) for all x ∈ y \ y′ . This follows from Schrijver [21, Corollary 39.12a], but here we 
give a direct proof by induction on 
∣∣y′ \ y∣∣:
• ∣∣y′ \ y∣∣= 1: Apply Lemma 17 to y1 = y and y2 = y′ (using that for an RCAR strategy, P∗(y1) > 0 implies P∗(x1, y1) > 0
for all x1 ∈ y1) to find the required inequality.
• ∣∣y′ \ y∣∣ > 1: Let y′1 = y′ and pick any x1 ∈ y \ y′ . Starting with i = 1, apply the basis exchange property on y \ {xi}
and y′i to find x
′
i (it will be in y
′
i \ y ⊆ y′); then apply it again on y′i \ {x′i} and y to find xi+1 ∈ y \ y′i , defining the 
message y′i+1 = y′i \ {x′i} ∪ {xi+1} (which may not be in YP∗ ). Continue until xi+1 = x1. Now π defined by π(x1) =
x′ , . . . , π(xi) = x′ is a bijection from {x1, . . . , xi} = (y ∩ y′ ) \ y′ ⊆ y \ y′ to {x′ , . . . , x′} = y′ \ y′ ⊆ y′ \ y (to see this, 1 i i+1 1 i i+1
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j+1 so that it will not be found 
again; an element x j+1 found in the other basis exchange is added to y′j+1 with the same result), and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i, 
applying Lemma 17 to y and y ∪ {x′j} \ {x j} tells us that λx j ≤ λx′j as required. If y′i+1 = y, then this is the bijection we 
are looking for; otherwise, it can be completed by combining it with a bijection from y \ y′i+1 to y′i+1 \ y, which exists 
by the induction hypothesis.
If also y′ ∈ YP∗ , a bijection π ′ from y′ \ y to y \ y′ such that λx′ ≤ λπ ′(x′) is found by the same argument. Together, π and 
π ′ divide the outcomes in the two sets into disjoint cycles that must all have the same value for λ, defining an equivalence 
relation ∼ on y ⊕ y′ . For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q obeys qx = e−λx , so it must also be constant within each 
equivalence class of ∼. Because the entropy of logarithmic loss is strictly concave, the conditionals of P∗ must agree with q
by Theorem 10.
Now take an arbitrary loss function L satisfying the conditions in the theorem, and the same strategy P∗ . At an arbitrary 
message y with P∗(y) > 0, choose a supporting hyperplane λ′ ∈ y to HL  y at P∗(· | y) with the property that λ′x = λ′x′
for all x, x′ ∈ y with λx = λx′ and between which L is symmetric: there P∗(x | y) = P∗(x′ | y), so such a supporting hyper-
plane exists. For all x, x′ ∈ y with qx > qx′ (equivalently, λx < λx′ ) between which L is symmetric, this λ′ satisfies λ′x ≤ λ′x′ . 
(A supporting hyperplane to HL  y at P∗(· | y) with λ′x > λ′x′ would be lower at (P∗)x↔x
′
(· | y) than at P∗(· | y), while by 
symmetry HL is the same at those points: a contradiction.)
For each y′ ∈ YP∗ other than y, we saw that each x′ ∈ y′ \ y is in the same equivalence class of ∼ as some x ∈ y \ y′ . 
In addition to λx = λx′ , x ∼ x′ implies that L is symmetric between x and x′ (because L is symmetric with respect to 
exchanges in Y , and π and π ′ were constructed using such exchanges). We extend the definition of λ′ to y′ by setting 
λ′x′ = λ′x . This way, λ′ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  y′ at P∗(· | y′). We repeat this for all y′ ∈ YP∗ , defining λ′
on all of X .
Also, for each y′ ∈ Y \YP∗ and y ∈ YP∗ , we have that a bijection π exists from y \ y′ to y′ \ y such that for all x ∈ y \ y′ , 
L is symmetric between x and π(x), and λx ≤ λπ(x); then also λ′x ≤ λ′π(x) , so λ′ defines a dominating hyperplane to HL  y′ . 
Thus λ′ is a KT-vector certifying that P∗ is also worst-case optimal for L.
For the converse: If HL is strictly concave, the supporting hyperplanes defined by a KT-vector λ′ each touch HL  y at 
only one point, so that any worst-case optimal strategy P ′ for the quizmaster must have P ′(x | y) = qx for all x ∈ y with 
P ′(y) > 0. Therefore any worst-case optimal P ′ must be RCAR. 
Proof of Theorem 20. We will first show how to construct a vector q ∈ RX>0 that satisfies 
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y , and for 
all x ∈ X , there is a message x ∈ y ∈ Y with ∑x∈y qx = 1. Then we will determine a marginal so that this vector q is the 
RCAR vector of the game with that marginal. We will additionally find two intersecting messages, both having sum 1, such 
that q represents the uniform distribution on one, but not on the other.
Two different constructions are given: one for nonuniform and one for uniform games.
If the game is not uniform, let k2 be the size of the largest message in Y . By connectedness, there exists a message of 
size less than k2 that has nonempty intersection with a message of size k2. From among such messages, let y1 be one of 
maximum size, and let k1 < k2 be that size. Finally, let y2 be a messages of size k2 that maximizes |y2 ∩ y1|. Set initial 
values for q as follows:
qx =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
k1
for x ∈ y1;
|y1\y2||y2\y1| · 1k1 for x ∈ y2 \ y1;
1
|y2\y1| · 1k1 otherwise.
Note that the three cases of qx are listed in nonincreasing order. Now 
∑
x∈y1 qx =
∑
x∈y2 qx = 1, while 
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for 
general y ∈ Y : maxx qx = 1/k1, so a message y ∈ Y with |y| ≤ k1 will have sum at most 1; a message with |y| = k2 will 
share no more outcomes with y1 than y2 does and thus cannot have a larger sum; and because a message with k1 < |y| < k2
has empty intersection with y2, the k1 − 1 largest elements of (qx)x∈y sum to at most (k1 − 1)/k1, while the fewer than 
|y2 \ y1| remaining elements all equal 1/(|y2 \ y1| · k1) and hence sum to less than 1/k1.
A greedy algorithm that repeatedly increments some qx until none can be increased further, while maintaining the 
inequality 
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 on each y, will terminate with a q satisfying the conditions stated at the beginning of the proof. 
This q will be unchanged and thus still be uniform on y1, while on the intersecting message y2, q also still sums to 1 but 
is not uniform.
For the case of uniform games, the construction is similar. Let k be the size of the game’s messages. By Oxley [24, 
Corollary 2.1.5], a nonempty family of sets Y is the collection of bases of a matroid if and only if for all y1, y2 ∈ Y and 
x2 ∈ y2 \ y1,
y1 ∪ {x2} \ {x1} ∈ Y for some x1 ∈ y1 \ y2. (A.3)
Because our Y is not a matroid, it follows that there exist y1, y2 ∈Y and x2 ∈ y2 \ y1 for which no corresponding x1 exists. 
For k ≥ 3 (which holds because the game we consider is not a graph game), we claim something stronger: that there exist 
y1, y2, x2 as above with the additional property that y1 and y2 intersect. The proof of this claim is below.
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qx =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
k for x ∈ y1;
1
k + 	 for x= x2;
1
k − 	 otherwise.
Because any message containing x2 also contains at least one other outcome not in y1, we again have 
∑
x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all 
y ∈Y .
For k ≥ 3, the initial q has the property that the set of outcomes x for which qx cannot be increased further (we call these 
outcomes maximized) is connected by messages y with 
∑
x∈y x = 1 (that is, the maximized outcomes cannot be partitioned 
into two nonempty sets such that each sum-1 message is contained in one of these sets); this is because y1 has sum 1, 
and any other message with sum 1 must intersect y1. (For k = 2, this would not be the case: the only messages having 
sum 1 would be y1 and all messages that contain x2, but y1 would not intersect any of these.) We can have the greedy 
algorithm maintain this as an invariant: Because the game is connected, there is always a message partially in the set of 
maximized outcomes and partially outside. We call such a message a crossing message. Each round, we pick an outcome 
x that is not maximized yet and is contained in a crossing message; if x2 is not maximized, we always pick x = x2 (using 
that it is contained in the crossing message y2). The tightest constraint on increasing qx will come from a crossing message, 
because for any non-crossing message y  x, we have ∑x′∈y\{x} qx′ = (k −1)(1/k −	), which is the smallest possible value of 
this sum. So increasing qx as much as possible will cause a crossing message to get sum equal to 1. This message connects 
x to the set of previously maximized outcomes, and any other outcomes that were maximized by this increment must be 
contained in some message that also contains x.
When the greedy algorithm terminates, q will still be uniform on y1, while there will be another message on which q
sums to one but is not uniform. (This may not be y2, which may not have sum 1.) Because all outcomes are connected by 
sum-1 messages, we can also find a pair of intersecting messages, one of which is uniform and one of which is not. Use 
these two messages as y1 and y2 in the sequel.
Having found, for both nonuniform and uniform games, a vector q and messages y1 and y2 as described above, we let 
strategy P be RCAR with vector q and P (y) uniform on {y |∑x∈y qx = 1}. This P is a worst-case optimal strategy for the 
game with logarithmic loss and marginal px =∑yx P (x, y), and q is its unique RCAR vector.
We will show that P is not worst-case optimal for the game with the same marginal and Brier loss. Brier loss is proper 
and continuous, so by Theorem 9, L(x, P (· | y1)) = L(x, P (· | y2)) for worst-case optimal P . These are squared Euclidean 
distances from a vertex of the simplex to the predicted distribution. However, the equality will not hold for P :
Among all predictions in yi with Q (x) = qx for each x ∈ y1 ∩ y2 (this set of predictions is the intersection of yi
with an affine subspace), the squared Euclidean distance L(x, Q ) between such Q and given vertex x ∈ y1 ∩ y2 is uniquely 
minimized by Q uniform on the outcomes not in y1∩ y2 (this is the orthogonal projection of the vertex onto that subspace). 
For a uniform game, P (· | y1) is uniform and thus L(x, P (· | y1)) equals this minimum; P (· | y1) differs from the uniform 
distribution at some outcomes not in y1 ∩ y2 and thus L(x, P (· | y2)) is larger than the minimum.
For a nonuniform game, P (· | y1) is uniform on y1 \ y2 and P (· | y2) is uniform on y2 \ y1, so both minimize the 
distance to the vertex in their respective subspaces. However, the subspace for y2 is isomorphic to a subspace contained in 
the subspace for y1 and not containing P (· | y1). Therefore L(x, P (· | y1)) < L(x, P (· | y2)). 
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that any pair of intersecting messages y, y′ obeys the above exchange prop-
erty (A.3) for all x′ ∈ y′ \ y. Let y1, y2 be two messages that fail (A.3) for some outcome x2 ∈ y2 \ y1; it follows from our 
assumption that they are disjoint. Because Y is connected, there exists a sequence of messages starting with y1 and ending 
with y2 in which adjacent messages intersect. Using (A.3), we can extend this sequence to one where adjacent messages 
differ by the exchange of one outcome: given intersecting y, y′′ ∈ Y with d := ∣∣y′′ \ y∣∣> 1, we find y′ ∈ Y with ∣∣y′ \ y∣∣= 1
and 
∣∣y′′ \ y′∣∣= d − 1. Write the entire sequence as y0 = y1, y1, . . . , yn = y2.
We have n ≥ k, because n < k would imply that y1 ∩ y2 = ∅. If n > k, we can find a shorter sequence as follows: pick 
0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − k for which yi ∩ y j+1 = ∅; this holds if j + 1 − i < k, so such i, j can always be found if k ≥ 3. Let x′ be the 
unique outcome in y j+1 \ y j .
• If x′ /∈ y j+k (intuitively, adding x′ leads us on a detour that can be avoided when going to y j+k): In each of the k
exchange steps from y j to y j+k , one outcome was removed. One of those outcomes was x′ , which is not in y j , so at 
most k − 1 outcomes from y j were removed. Thus y j and y j+k intersect, and a shorter path between them can be 
found using (A.3).
• If x′ ∈ y j+k and x′ ∈ yi (removing x′ is the start of a detour): We can use (A.3) to find a shorter path between yi and 
y j+k .
• If x′ ∈ y j+k but x′ /∈ yi (adding x′ is apparently useful, but can be done sooner): Apply (A.3) to messages yi and y j+1
(which intersect) and outcome x′ (which is in y j+1 but not in yi ) to find a message y′ that is one step away from yi
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y j+k in at most k steps.
Thus we can always find a sequence with n = k.
Given such a sequence y0, y1, . . . , yn , we will now show a contradiction with the assumption that y1 = y0 and y2 = yn
fail (A.3) by showing that for any x2 ∈ y2, a message exists that differs from y1 by adding x2 and removing one other 
outcome. If x2 ∈ y1, then y1 is such a message and we are done. Otherwise, we can apply (A.3) to y1 and x2 ∈ y2 to find 
a message y′ containing x2; because k ≥ 3, this message still intersects y1, so applying (A.3) to y1 and x2 ∈ y′ gives the 
message we are looking for. This shows by contradiction that if a connected uniform game with k ≥ 3 is not a matroid 
game, there exists a pair of intersecting messages y1, y2 and an outcome x2 ∈ y2 \ y1 that do not satisfy (A.3). 
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